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China and Korea have had relations for more than two thousand years. During 
that period, China greatly influenced Korea. However, as a result of China’s defeat in the 
Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895 and the Japanese annexation of Korea from 1910 to 
1945, the influence of China over Korea began to wane and was then lost. Meanwhile, 
while the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was the Republic of Korea (ROK)’s primary 
enemy state, and the United States became the ROK’s only military alliance state, 
particularly due to their intervention in the Korean War in the Cold War era, the PRC, 
coupled with the United States, has become one of the most important partnership 
countries of the ROK in terms of security and economy on the Korean peninsula in the 
post-Cold War era. More importantly, the PRC is the only state which enjoys good 
relations with the two Koreas. Under these circumstances, the ROK’s amicable relations 
with the PRC and the United States must be extremely important factors for Korean 
reconciliation and the reunification process. This thesis mainly examines Korea’s 
historical relations with China and the United States, anticipates the role of China in 
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The purpose of my thesis, titled ‘The Role of China in Korean Unification’, is to 
provide those who work for the Republic of Korea (ROK) government, particularly the 
Ministry of Unification of the ROK with policy recommendations regarding China’s role 
in Korean unification in order to help them make a more cohesive and balanced policy 
toward the PRC in favor of a South Korea-led, reasonable and peaceful unification on the 
Korean peninsula. Despite the contemporary emphasis as this thesis is being completed 
(May 2003) upon North Korea’s nuclear policies and their importance for inter-Korean 
relations, the purpose of this thesis is to assess the broader context of China’s role in the 
inter-Korean relationship that will lead to Korean reunification.  
 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Historically, China has had great influence over Korea for about 2,000 years in 
the past, thanks to sharing a border. As a result, on the one hand, Korean dynasties 
benefited considerably from Chinese dynasties; on the other hand, Korean dynasties 
suffered extremely from Chinese dynasties. However, after the Chinese were defeated by 
the Japanese in the Sino-Japanese War from 1894 to 1895, the influence of China over 
Korea began to wane and was then completely lost when Japan forcibly annexed Korea in 
1910. 
Meanwhile, right after the defeat of Japan in the Second World War that ended in 
August 1945, Korea became partitioned into two Koreas by the United States and the 
Soviet Union for the purpose of eliminating the remaining Japanese troops on the Korean 
peninsula. While the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established under democracy below 
the 38th parallel on the Korean peninsula in August 1948, the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) was created under communism above the line on September 
of the same year. To make matters worse, the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) was declared by Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s  
1 
paramount leader in October 1949. After that, the PRC began to have a great impact on 
the Korean peninsula through the Chinese intervention in the Korean War on the side of 
the DPRK in 1950.  
At 04:00 a.m. on June 25, 1950, the Korean War began.  While fifteen member 
nations of the United Nations, especially the United States, helped South Korea by 
preventing her from becoming a communist country, the PRC sent volunteers to North 
Korea and the Soviet Union also helped both North Korea and China with her weapons, 
fuel, food, medicines and military supplies for making the Korean peninsula a communist 
country.  Since the armistice agreement was signed between the United Nations, the 
DPRK, and the PRC at Panmunjom on July 27, 1953, Korea has been divided into two 
Koreas, North and South Korea for about fifty years. During that period, the PRC and the 
Soviet Union became the two main benefactors for North Korea. 
However, the collapse of the communist bloc in the early 1990s and then the end 
of the Cold War era actually had a great impact all over the world, particularly on the 
PRC and the Russian Federation or the former Soviet Union. As a result, in the PRC, for 
example, “the only ideology of the Chinese leadership today is: ‘To get rich is glorious.’ 
China’s leaders cannot deliver on that ideology without the billions of dollars in foreign 
investment that pours into China each year.”1 In case of Russia today, “the Russians have 
eliminated central planning, communist ideology and the Commissars…”2 
In the context of the unification of Germany in October 1990, the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 and changes of the PRC in the present era, we can anticipate 
that Korean unification will come true. In this point of view, if Korean unification will 
sooner or later take place on the Korean peninsula, it is time that we have to think of 
which country has a great impact on North Korea, how she can do that and why she has 
to do it for Korean unification. 
 
 
                                                  
1 Thomas L. Friedman. The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York: Anchor Books, 2000. p. 259.  
2 Ibid., p. 415. 
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First, I would like to take a look at the relations between the PRC and the two 
Koreas. As a result of the PRC’s huge aid to the DPRK throughout the Korean War, the 
PRC has had long and friendly blood ties--the so-called “lips and teeth” relations--with 
the DPRK from then on.  
China remains a substantial aid donor to North Korea, although this 
assistance diminished sharply in the early 1990s. It has again increased in 
the latter half of the 1990s.3  
In the Cold War era, on the other hand, relations between the PRC and South Korea had 
been under the situation that “the two adversaries employed policies of containment, non-
dialogue, and non-recognition against one another.”4 Especially after the advent of the 
post-Cold War era in the early 1990s, however, the PRC has enjoyed increasingly 
growing economic and diplomatic relations with the ROK since 1992 when the PRC and 
ROK established normalization because the PRC changed its policy toward the Korean 
peninsula from a one-Korea policy to a two-Korea policy in accordance with a Chinese 
national policy shift from ideology to pragmatism that started in the late 1970s right after 
the death of Mao Zedong. In addition, “Chinese wariness persists over various Seoul-
centered unification scenarios and the U.S. role that might be entailed under various 
circumstances.”5 Under this circumstance, for instance, the ROK President Kim Dae Jung 
and the DPRK Leader Kim Jung Il could sit around the table to take the first step toward 
Korean unification with the PRC’s help at the two Koreas’ summit talk in Pyongyang in 
June 2000 due to the PRC’s good relations with both North and South Korea.  
Second, however, was how Russian influence on North Korea changed after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. 
Moscow became progressively more marginalized in its peninsular role.  
Indeed, given the substantial (and growing) ROK economic interactions 
with China, Russia is no longer able to compete credibly with its neighbor 
for the attention of the South. Russia feels excluded from policy 
developments on the peninsula in a number of realms: the KEDO process  
                                                 
3 Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min Lee. Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and 
Implications. Washington, D.C.: RAND’s Arroyo Center, 1999. p. 9. 
4 Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross. Engaging China: The Management of An Emerging 
Power. New York, NY: Routledge, 1999. p. 32. 
5 Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min Lee (1999), p. 14. 
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had blocked possible Russian reactor sales to the North; Moscow (as well 
as Tokyo) has no seat at the four-party talks; and Russia’s economic and 
security linkages with the North have clearly diminished.6 
On the other hand, though, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
United States has become a more influential power over Korean affairs. Nevertheless, 
although the United States has maintained strong ties with the ROK for more than half a 
century after the U.S. intervention in the Korean War, it has no friendly ties with the 
DPRK.  
In the context of the dynamic changes of relations among them, especially  
Among the four powers [the PRC, the United States, Russia, and Japan], 
China is the only country that currently has good relations with both North 
and South Korea. This gives China the responsibility to play a more 
important role in further promoting peace and stability on the Korean 
peninsula.7  
Therefore, it is the PRC that must be able to play a key role as an intermediary 
among the ROK, the DPRK, and the U.S. in Korean unification. At this point, the PRC 
must be an extremely important factor for the security of Northeast Asia as well as 
Korean unification. In order to achieve peaceful Korean unification, the PRC also must 
make every endeavor, in a constructive way, to make the DPRK open to the world as well 
as to change its ideological and bellicose-oriented policy into a pragmatic and amicable 
one. 
Even though the roles of such powerful countries as the United States, the Russian 
Federation or former the Soviet Union, and Japan on the Korean peninsula have been 
important enough to have a great influence in the Korean affairs throughout Korean 
modern history, this paper will be focused on the PRC’s role in Korean unification. 
 
C. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT 
The major question in my thesis is: what kinds of roles can China or the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) play in Korean unification? To find the best answer to the main 
question, in addition, sub-questions following the major question are as follows: 
                                                 
6 Ibid., p. 16.  
7 Chen Qimao. “The Role of the Greater Powers in the Process of Korean Reunification.” Korean 
Unification. Amos A. Jordan. (Ed.) Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1993. p. 78. 
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• Why is it expected that China will play a key role in Korean unification? 
• What roles did China play throughout Korea’s history in the past? 
• Are China’s relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) constructive in Korean 
unification? 
• Are China’s views on Korean unification affirmative or negative? 
Each of the sub-questions has something relevant to do with a major question in 
each chapter. These sub-questions will be examined and analyzed in each chapter as well. 
With regard to my thesis, it is the conventional wisdom on my topic that China or 
the PRC “[doesn’t] seek big changes in the political or military status quo”8 on the 
Korean peninsula. Because it is believed that the PRC views (or has viewed) the DPRK 
as “a buffer state”9 as well as an ideologically important ally, it is estimated that China 
continues to support the DPRK regime’s survival while benefiting economically by 
improving its relations with the ROK and the United States, and attaining greater 
influence on Korean affairs by promoting as much stability as possible through its good 
relations with two Koreas on the Korean peninsula. 
However, my argument in this thesis is that China will play a great role in Korean 
unification. Throughout Korean history, although Korean dynasties suffered from 
Chinese dynasties from time to time due to sharing a border, Korean dynasties could keep 
peace with China and import advanced civilization from China, and also develop their 
own creative culture through tributary relations. China played a role as a patron for the 
development of Korea’s political and cultural civilization throughout Korean history until 
1910. That is why today most Koreans feel more familiar and comfortable with the 
Chinese than any other foreign people. Although it is common sense that we regard both 
the Soviet Union and China as two major benefactors for North Korea, as mentioned 
earlier, China has become a more substantial aid donor to the North than the Russian 
Federation has been since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. China has 
                                                 
8 Robert G. Sutter. Chinese Policy Priorities and Their Implication for the United States. Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000. p. 104. 
9 Denny Roy. China’s Foreign Relations. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
1998. p. 208. 
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maintained good relations with North Korea in particular since the Korean War and at the 
same time with South Korea since the establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1992.  
China’s good relations with the two Koreas imply that it is able to play an 
important role as a main intermediary among the ROK, the DPRK, and the United States, 
which are all decisive states in Korean unification. 
In addition, when we think economic and political changes or reforms within 
China will be conducive to those within North Korea, China can play a role as the main 
driving force for helping North Korea follow China’s reforms as well as help create a 
peaceful and South Korea-led unification as well. Because China has no choice but to 
acquiesce to a South Korean-led peaceful unification when considering the present 
situation, particularly economic disparity between the two Koreas and because China is 
able to gain benefits from a unified Korea, China’s views on Korean unification issue 
will be affirmative.  
To support and prove my argument, I will examine and analyze China’s historical 
relations with Korea. In addition, I will depend largely on the discourse on Korean affairs 
produced by politicians, journalists, and analysts within the PRC as well as Korea 
specialists outside China. Through such primary sources and the secondary literature, I 
will indirectly access both the PRC’s views on Korean unification and its roles in 
reunification on the Korean peninsula. 
 
D. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In Chapter I or introduction, first of all, I raised the main research question and 
then a series of sub-questions that will provide answers to the main question as well. I 
explained the conventional wisdom on my thesis topic that China or the PRC does not 
seek big changes in the political or military status quo on the Korean peninsula and then 
argued that my research would contradict such conventional wisdom. In addition, I 
explained China’s importance in Korean unification. In other words, I stated why it is 




To examine, analyze, and prove my main argument, Chapter II will 
chronologically in descending order of Korean dynasties describe the historical 
relationship between China and Korea from the first relations between two countries in a 
state-to-state status from around 108 B.C. to 1948 when Korea was partitioned into the 
two Koreas, the Republic of Korea (the ROK or South Korea) and the Democratic 
Peoples’ Republic of Korea (the DPRK or North Korea). At the end of this chapter, I will 
assess what role China played throughout Korean history until 1948, and what was 
China’s impact on Korea until then.  
Chapter III will probe the relations between the two Koreas and the PRC in the 
Cold War era (from 1948 when the ROK and the DPRK were founded through 1949 
when the PRC was established until 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed). This will 
focus on the ROK-U.S., the PRC-DPRK, and the PRC-ROK bilateral relations, 
particularly in terms of military and economic security among them.  
In Chapter IV, the relations between the two Koreas and the PRC will be probed 
in the fields of military and economic security during the period of the post-Cold War 
world from the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 to the present. First, in this chapter, 
the ROK-U.S., the PRC-DPRK, and the PRC-ROK bilateral relationship trends will be 
examined. Second, both the PRC’s and the ROK’s approach to multilateralism will be 
explained. Finally, the PRC’s and the ROK’s attitudes toward multilateralism for their 
respective unification will be examined at the end of this chapter.  
In Chapter V, the PRC’s views on Korean unification will be examined and 
analyzed in the light of ideology, economy, great powers dynamics, and territorial and 
ethnic Korean issues. At the end of this chapter, an overall assessment of the PRC’s 
views on Korean reunification will be offered and then I will assess whether China’s 
views on the issue are affirmative or negative. 
Finally, my conclusion for this thesis will be presented in Chapter VI. The last 
chapter will anticipate China’s role in Korean unification in the future. In addition, I will 
create policy recommendations related to the PRC’s role in reunification on the Korean 
peninsula for those who work for the Republic of Korea (ROK) government, particularly 
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II. THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KOREA 
AND CHINA 
The Korean peninsula has played a geographically and strategically important role 
in East Asia, as the bridge or gateway between the Eurasian Continent and the Pacific 
Ocean because the geographical position of the Korean peninsula is located in the midst 
of powerful countries such as China, Russia and Japan in Northeast Asia. Historically, 
China and Mongolia conspired to invade Japan by way of Korea, but they failed in their 
attempts in the 13th century. Conversely, Japan also invaded China and Russia through 
Korea, called Chosun at that time creating the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895 and the 
Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905, in both of which Japan and Russia were eager to 
attain an influential power over the Korean peninsula. The Korean War started in 1950 
escalating the Cold War tensions between the superpowers. Due to the geo-strategically 
important position of the Korean peninsula in East Asia, Korea has been largely under the 
historically difficult situation like a Korean proverb, ‘shrimp between whales’ or ‘the 
conflicts between whales break a shrimp’s back.’  
Korea shares its long border with China north of the Korean peninsula. Korean 
dynasties, on the one hand, experienced and had to overcome numerous invasions, 
political interferences and status as a vassal of Chinese dynasties, especially in parts of a 
519 year long Yi dynasty. Due to its morphological proximity to China, on the other 
hand, this was advantageous for Korea in taking advantage of developments in the fields 
of politics, economy, society, and culture from China. For example, Koreans suffered 
from the Mongol invasion in the 13th century and the Ching dynasty’s interference during 
the Yi dynasty, both of which were from Mongols and Manchus who were only two 
foreign rulers of China and later became sinicized throughout the Chinese history, 
whereas Korean dynasties could unify Korea with the Tang dynasty’s help in the 7th 




Korea’s relations with China lasted for about two thousand years, however, they 
began to wane after the Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, and officially ended 
after Korea was forcibly annexed by Japan in August 1910. Nevertheless, the relations 
between the two countries continued unofficially until the liberation of Korea from Japan 
in 1945 and its legal partition into two Koreas in 1948. 
In this chapter, the relations between Sino-Korean dynasties will be 
chronologically researched from around the 4th century B.C. (unfortunately, though there 
is no written history about the origin of Korea, it is definitely around the 4th century B.C. 
that Old Choson as a federation of walled town states existed and began to have its first 
relations with China) until 1948 when Korea was partitioned into two Koreas. The roles 
China played throughout Korea’s history until 1948 will be assessed. 
 
A. FIRST RELATIONS (CIRCA FOURTH CENTURY B.C.)  
It is important that we know when the foundation of a Korean state occurred for 
the first time. If we find it, we can more easily acknowledge the first relationship between 
the two countries, Korea and China. Therefore, first I will look at the origins of a Korean 
state, when the first contact between them appeared, what it was like, and what role it 
played. 
Generally speaking, almost all Koreans believe that Korea has more than 5,000 
years of history.  One of the most important reasons for their belief is due to the myth of 
Tangun, a founder of the first Korean state, who supposedly founded it in 2333 B.C.  
Additionally, some historians assert that  
between 6000 B.C. and 4000 B.C. [the new stone age on the Korean 
peninsula] a group of people migrated into the Korean peninsula from 
Central Asia and the Altaic mountain region. These people were of the 
Neolithic Age. The Neolithic people are thought to be the direct ancestors 
of Korean people.10   
We, however, cannot accept the first reason as a basis of the first Korean state because it 
is just a pure myth. In addition, the second reason is not acceptable because, even though 
they are in fact Koreans’ direct forefathers, there is no historical evidence about whether 
                                                 
10 History of Korea Prehistoric to AD. 1910. April 17, 2002. 
[http://www.indiana.edu/~easc/pages/easc/curriculum/korea/1995/general/hand6_1.htm]. 
10 
they, ‘a group of people’, organized a kind of society, that is, as states or not. It is, 
however, definite that human beings existed on the Korean peninsula even much earlier 
than 7,000 ~ 8,000 years ago according to excavations found at Paleolithic sites.  
Furthermore, generally the Shang dynasty is regarded as not only China’s, but also East 
Asia’s first state (a traditional date: 1766 B.C.) authenticated by archaeology and history.  
The Bronze Age on the Korean peninsula is an important factor in terms of the 
conception of a state. The Bronze Age lasted approximately from the 9th century B.C. 
until the 4th century B.C.. During the period of the Bronze Age, rice agriculture as well as 
cultivation of rice had been introduced from China into Korea, and the changes of their 
lives into an agrarian society caused them to settle in one place and create a society or a 
burgeoning state. Archaeologists have excavated the evidence that the Bronze Age people 
built earthen forts and lived in walled towns.11 Out of these ambiances, Old Choson was 
founded as a state. Unfortunately there is no explicitly historical proof of Old Choson, 
nevertheless, “what can be demonstrated with evidence is that [Old] Choson was an 
amalgamation of Walled Town states; tribal states of agricultural peoples that 
demonstrated the first glimpses of political cohesion.”12   
By the fourth century B.C., … a number of small states on the peninsula 
had survived long enough to come to the attention of China, and the most 
illustrious was Old Choson…Choson prospered into a civilization based 
on bronze culture and a political federation of many walled towns, which 
(judging from Chinese accounts) was formidable to the point of arrogance. 
Composed of a horse-riding people who deployed bronze weapons, 
Choson extended its influence to the north, taking most of the Liaotung 
basin.13 
No one doubts these walled town states which were created during the Bronze 
Age were the origins of Korean states with a primitive political culture. In the late fourth 
century, Old Choson’s expansion into the northern areas provoked the powerful Chinese 
state of Yen (1122-255 B.C.) to push Old Choson back south of the Chongchon River 
near present day Anju city in the northwest area of North Korea. The Yen state was 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 History of Korea Main Page: Early History (Through 313 C.E.). April 20, 2002. 
[http://loki.stockton.edu/~gilmorew/consorti/1deasia.htm]. 
13 Bruce Cumings. Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History. New York, New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, Inc., 1997, pp. 25 - 26. 
11 
defeated by the Chin empire between 230-221 B.C. and then the Chin fell to the Han 
dynasty in 206 B.C. Meanwhile, Wiman, a leader of refugees from China during the 
vicissitudes of Chin and Han, usurped the kingship of Old Choson King Chun between 
194-180 B.C., but Wiman Choson was conquered in 108 B.C. by the Han. After that, the 
Han dynasty established ‘four commanderies’ in the area as far north as one third of the 
Korean peninsula to exert control over Korea.14  
Four commanderies consisted of Nangnang, Jinburn, Imdoon, and Hyendo (Lo-
lang, Chen-fan, Lin-tun, and Hsuan-tu in Chinese). The Han dynasty sent a viceroy there 
respectively to govern. They, however, did not directly rule over them but allowed 
Wiman Choson people to govern themselves. Jinburn, Imdoon and Hyendo were 
abolished by 75 B.C. because of resistance by the Wiman Choson people, and Nangnang 
lasted until 313 A.D. when it was abandoned to Koguryo, a local Korean tribal state in 
the north.15 Even during that period, some of the indigenous people took titles such as the 
magistrate of a district or king, and proceeded to take a step toward an independent 
country. At that time, the main roles of Chinese commanderies were as follows: 
Lo-lang (Nangnang in Korean) at Pyongyang, the Old Choson capital, 
continued to exercise a vague sort of suzerainty over the whole of Korea. 
Lo-lang…remained a rich outpost of Chinese civilization for four 
centuries… The historic role of the Chinese commanderies in Korea was 
much like that of the contemporary Roman colonies in Britain…they [the 
later Korean kingdoms] derived much of their higher culture from contacts 
with these outposts of Chinese civilization.16 
By 43 A.D., Rome occupied Britain and the Roman colony of Britannia was 
established and governed by a governor. Eventually, many Celtic Britons become 
‘Romanized’ through Roman civilized culture, while others continued to rebel until the 
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fifth century A.D.17 In a similar manner, Lo-lang played a key role in “a great center of 
Sino-Korean statecraft, art, industry (including the mining of iron ore), and commerce.”18 
B. THREE KINGDOMS AND THE UNIFIED SILLA (THE FIRST 
CENTURY-918) 
After the collapse of Chinese commanderies in 313 A.D., three native kingdoms 
(Koguryo, Paekche and Silla) emulated each other in order to have an influence over the 
Korean peninsula, even though they had already existed during the period of Chinese 
commanderies. Although Kaya and three federations of Mahan, Chinhan and Pyonhan 
existed along with three kingdoms, I will not emphasize Kaya and the three federations, 
which were respectively organized by a number of tribes and remained during the first 
three centuries A.D., because each of them had small territory in the southern portion of 
the peninsula, few relationships with China and little importance in Korean history 
compared to the contemporary three kingdoms. In this section, I will probe into what 
relationship they had with China in their competition and development? What kinds of 
benefits did they get from China? And what role did China play in the unification of Silla 
in 668 A.D.? 
 
1. Koguryo 
Koguryo had emerged in south-western Manchuria around 37 B.C.  Koguryo had 
periodically fought with China in southern Manchuria during the period of the Chinese 
commanderies, deprived China of the controlling power over Lo-lang, and eventually 
caused China to end the Lo-lang commandery in 313 A.D. Although Koguryo suffered 
from the frequent warfare with Northern China during the period against the Chinese 
commanderies, that hardship made Koguryo the most powerful state--surpassing 




                                                 
17 S. Kemmer. Chronology of Event in the History of English. May 28, 2002, 
[http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~kemmer/Words/chron.html]. 
18 Bruce Cumings (1997), pp. 26 - 27. 
13 
From the fourth century,  
Koguryo also maintained tributary relations with whichever was the chief 
state in North China, and in the fifth century it added relations with the 
successor dynasties in South China. Thus it was able to import Chinese 
culture directly from its source.19  
As a result, it was from China that Buddhism in 372 A.D, the Confucian classics, and 
Chinese type of law code were introduced to Koguryo. Particularly after moving the 
capital in 427 A.D. from Kungnae near the Yalu River to Pyongyang, ‘the former 
headquarters of the Lo-lang commandery’, Koguryo applied Chinese style ‘agricultural 
taxes’, ‘corvee labor’, and ‘bureaucratic government’ for its own government so that it 
could prosper more and more. “It also developed a more Sinicized form of government, 
with complex hierarchies of bureaucratic officials and organized garrisons of soldiers 
ruling over the subject peoples.” After that, it enjoyed a status as the most powerful 
kingdom on the Korean peninsula for about two centuries from the 5th to 7th century.20  
 
2. Paekche 
Paekche was organized about 18 B.C. in the southwest portion of the Korean 
peninsula, and it became the first to build a strong military state while Koguryo was 
weakened by--and suffered from--incessant wars with China. As Koguryo grew, 
however, Paekche was becoming so weak that she had to form an alliance with Southern 
China and later Silla in order to defend itself from Koguryo’s invasions. As mentioned, 
Paekche initially came to power over the peninsula, but it gave way to Koguryo later. 
What is the reason? As seen above, Koguryo was able to prosper after importing and 
developing Chinese systems, whereas Paekche was completely blocked geographically 
by Koguryo from contacts with North China. 
Cut off from North China by Koguryo, it maintained close maritime 
contact with the dynasties of South China [especially with the southern 
Chinese dynasty of Eastern Chin] and usually recognized their suzerainty. 
Many cultural elements came to Paekche from South China.21  
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However, there were many more limitations and difficulties in maintaining the 
relations of Paekche with China by sea than by land, compared to the geographical 
proximity to China of Koguryo. Thus those problems later forced Paekche to ally with 
Japan and even Silla to fight against Koguryo. Apart from it, we can easily find the 
cultural influence of China over Paekche and Japan through the fact that Paekche 
introduced Buddhism and Chinese civilization to Japan, helped Japanese enjoy the highly 
developed Chinese culture, and had a great influence on the development of Japanese 
culture at that time.  
Nevertheless, although “Paekche was a centralized, aristocratic state blending 
Chinese and indigenous influence,”22 it was conquered by Silla in the 7th century because 
of not receiving the full support from their subject people.  
 
3. Silla and The Unified Silla 
Silla, in the southeast of the peninsula, was founded earliest among the three 
kingdoms in approximately 57 B.C., but it began a status as the weakest and most 
backward state among them during the three kingdom period. Because, just as Paekche 
was geographically isolated in the southwestern corner of the peninsula, Silla was located 
in the corner area of the southeastern coast. Silla had so little opportunity to have contact 
with China that it was the least influenced by Chinese civilization among them.  
Meanwhile, Koguryo defeated several attacks launched by the short-lived Sui 
dynasty that united China in 589 and lasted only about thirty years, and its victories 
finally had a decisive impact on the collapse of the Sui dynasty in the early 7th century. 
When the Tang dynasty that succeeded the Sui dynasty tried to make several expeditions 
to Koguryo, Koguryo successfully repelled Tang’s ambitions in 647, 648, and 655. After 
Tang’s failure of attacks on Koguryo, Silla had a chance to make an alliance with the 
Tang dynasty, whose main purpose was not helping the unification of the peninsula under 
Silla, but defeating Koguryo, and then exerting control over it. It became the main reason  
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that the Tang dynasty created the alliance with Silla. With the assistance of Tang, Silla 
eventually defeated Paekche in 660 and then Koguryo in 668 A.D., which finally unified 
Korea.23  
By that time “the Tang policy toward the Korean peninsula was…much the same 
as that toward other peoples bordering China. Conquest was to be followed, if possible, 
by assimilation.”24 Therefore, after unification of the three kingdoms by Silla with 
Tang’s aid, Tang “moved to establish administrative control over the entire peninsula. 
The land of the former kingdom of Paekche was divided into five governorships, with a 
Chinese military commander…[Tang] also attempted to subsume Silla within the sphere 
of new administration for the peninsula.”25 However, Silla enforced its military power 
against this Chinese attempt aimed at ruling over the whole country since 671, and Silla’s 
stubborn resistance and victories in wars with Tang forces drove Chinese out of the 
peninsula at last. Nevertheless, the Chinese continued to insist on the former Koguryo 
and Paekche territories as part of their rights until 736, but “they at last formally 
acknowledged that all the territory south of the Paesu (Taedong River) belonged to the 
independent kingdom of Silla” in return for Silla accepting its status as a tributary but 
autonomous state.26 
After that, Silla was able to directly contact and import Chinese political, 
economic, and cultural systems from the Tang dynasty by annual embassies, Buddhist 
monks and students who were sent to China to observe the tributary relations. “Through 
all this period increasing trade and cultural exchanges with the Tang were having a 
profound influence on every aspect of life.”27 Silla adopted Confucian learning, a civil 
service exam, housing, land-holding, land registers and tax system, Zen Buddhism,  
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Buddhist art, local place names, personal names and division of the country in the 
Chinese style. Silla became a “replica” of the Tang in miniature but retained a clear sense 
of its separate identity as Silla (e.g., metal art, bone ranks and idu writing system).28  
Although the Chinese were expelled from the peninsula by Silla in 676, 
their strong cultural impact remained. The Chinese stylistic and artistic 
influences beyond Buddhism were profound.29 
 
C. KORYO DYNASTY (918-1392) 
As the aristocrats in the late unified Silla era continued to live extravagantly, 
falling to corruption, the burdens of the commoners grew heavier, and their morale 
increasingly declined.  General Wang Kon united the commoners and founded the new 
dynasty of Koryo (918-1392). From the beginning, in terms of its relations with Chinese 
and non-Chinese dynasties, the Koryo dynasty was able to take political and cultural 
advantages of a unified Silla and Chinese dynasty in many aspects. However, since its 
founding, it had--at the same time--suffered from tricky and intricate relations with such 
non-Chinese dynasties as the Khitan Liao dynasty, the Chin dynasty under the Jurchen of 
Manchuria, and the Mongol Empire in the late Koryo period. In this section, I will assess 
Koryo’s relations with Chinese and non-Chinese dynasties and in particular the influence 
of the Mongol rule over Koryo. 
To establish a centralized government soon after the establishment of Koryo, the 
Koryo dynasty set up a political institution with “three central boards” in the Tang and 
Sung style (i.e., a Bureau of Military Affairs, the traditional Six Ministries, and a host of 
lesser administrative organs), and a central government school for teaching Confucian 
texts, and adopted a Chinese-style civil service examination system.30 In addition, trade 
between the Koryo and Sung dynasties also flourished as well--ranging from jewelry, 
textiles, and china to books and ginseng. Throughout the process, the Koryo dynasty was 
highly successful because the Koryo dynasty was easily able to take advantage of 
developed civilization from both a unified Silla and China, and to establish a centralized  
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government. Therefore, “the relationship between the two countries [Koryo and Sung 
dynasty] rested on a peaceful foundation of cultural and economic exchange, and this was 
precisely in conformity with the desires of the Koryo aristocracy.”31    
However, the relations between the Koryo and Sung dynasties began to shrink 
after the Sung dynasty was invaded by Khitans that, after then, began to call their own 
country Liao in 947, especially after Koryo refused Sung’s proposal when the Sung 
dynasty asked for Koryo to attack the Khitan and Jurchen at the same time. Since Koryo 
was frequently threatened by the Khitan and Jurchen, both of which were located 
northwest and northeast of Koryo respectively, it built a thousand li long wall (about a 
300-mile long wall), called Chullijangsung (in Korean) ranging from the mouth of the 
Yalu River to the present day city of Yonpo in North Korea over twelve years in order to 
defend the northern frontiers against the Khitan and Jurchen. As the 300-mile long wall 
suggests, Koryo had conflicts with and suffered from such non-Chinese dynasties as the 
Khitan and Jurchen dynasties, and later the Mongol empire during the greater part of the 
Koryo dynasty period.  
First, conflicts between Koryo and the Khitan resulted in three large-scale attacks 
of the Khitan on Koryo, in addition to several small-scale attacks from 993 to 1018.  In 
the first invasion, Koryo was able to avert a crisis through peace talks between the Khitan 
general Hsiao and Koryo general So Hui. In the second invasion, the Khitans occupied 
Kaesong, the capital of Koryo, but withdrew without gaining any special advantage 
excepting homage to the Khitan emperor.  In the third one, the 100,000 Khitan forces 
were all but annihilated by Koryo general Kang Kamchan and then peaceful relations 
between the two countries were maintained.32 Secondly, no sooner did Koryo set up a 
peaceful relationship with the Khitan than it became involved in serious trouble with the 
Chin succeeded by the Jurchen, named Akuta in 1115. At first the Jurchen admired 
Koryo because of Koryo’s advanced culture but such a situation changed within a milieu 
in which Koryo was at a disadvantage. Chin not only invaded and devastated the Khitan 
Liao dynasty in 1125 but also captured the Sung capital at Kaifeng in 1127. Then Chin 
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put increased pressure on Koryo as well, and finally demanded that Koryo accept a 
suzerain-subject relationship with it. Eventually, Yi Cha-gyom--who was a father-in-law 
of the then king and held sway over power at the time--assented to Chin’s demands. 
Although Koryo’s general Yun Kwan fiercely resisted against incessant attacks of the 
Jurchen and occupied some parts of their territory, Koryo eventually became a tributary 
to the Chin dynasty because of some Koryo aristocrats’ ambitions for power.33 From the 
early 13th century, thirdly, the Koryo-Mongol relations began for the purpose of subduing 
the Khitan forces. “The Mongols,” however, “conquered Chin in 1215 and chased the 
diehard Liao refugees into the territory of Koryo, which was consequently plagued by 
consecutive Mongol invasions.”34 The Mongol empire invaded Koryo six times between 
the 1230’s and 1250’s. Among them, in the first invasion of 1231, the Mongols crushed 
the Koryo forces and then seized the Koryo capital at Kaesong. As a result, the Mongol 
military governors became stationed in the peninsula whereas the Koryo court and 
officials fled to Kangwha Island in 1232. In the invasion of 1254, countless people were 
killed and more than 200,000 Koryo people were captured by the Mongol troops. Koryo 
was eventually conquered by the Mongols in 1258, in spite of the 40-year fight of Koryo 
people against the Mongols’ invasions. Koryo kings were forced to intermarry with 
Mongol princesses. After that, finally, Koryo fell into “a Mongol vassal state.” In fact, 
the ruling of the Mongol-Yuan empire in China over Koryo did not come to end until the 
Ming dynasty was founded in 1368.35  
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Overcoming hardships from the Khitans, Jurchens, and Mongols throughout 
Koryo history, “Koryo managed to hang on to independence and self-rule by whatever 
means possible, using on some occasions military force, at other times, diplomacy.”36 
Although incessant foreign invasions forced Koryo to, after all, accept the suzerainty of 
them and the destruction of its cities--including arts, buildings and treasures, the Koryo 
people never became sinicized either like the three kingdoms or a unified Silla. By 
contrast, China was ruled twice by such foreign people as the Mongol Yuan in the 13th 
century and the Manchu Ching dynasty during 250 years after the mid-17th century, but 
these foreign conquerors became easily and well sinicized each time due to the 
superiority of Chinese developed institutions and cultural systems. Instead, Korean 
people recreated the developed Chinese institutions and cultures within their own new 
creations. For example, Koryo people developed wooden block printing into wooden type 
printing and then invented the world’s first movable metal type on record in 1234. In 
addition, they printed in 1251 the Great Tae-jang-kyong (Great Collections of Buddhist 
Scriptures) with about 80,000 wooden plates, the so-called Koryo Tripitaka, in order to 
spiritually and religiously overcome foreign invasions. Especially, the conquest of the 
Mongols over Koryo had two important contrary influences. During the period of 
Mongol rule, the commoners suffered from economic hardships and the upper classes 
were at the same time politically and spiritually oppressed. Koryo, on the other hand, 
transformed such difficult situations into good chances more open to cultural and 
technological influences from abroad than any other times. The use of gunpowder and 
cotton, astronomical and mathematical knowledge, and Neo-Confucian philosophy were 
introduced to Koryo in spite of the warring period.  
 
D. YI DYNASTY (1392-1910) 
While the Mongol empire began to perish in the second half of the 14th century in 
China proper, the Ming dynasty succeeded it from 1368 until 1644. On the Korean 
peninsula, Yi Song-gye, the most powerful pro-Ming general of Koryo, finally overthrew 
the corrupt and inept Koryo dynasty and then founded the new dynasty. During the Yi 
dynasty era, both the Chinese Ming and then the Ching dynasty greatly influenced 
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Choson. In the late 19th century, however, tangled conflicts of interests over the Korean 
peninsula between China and Japan resulted in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895. As 
a result of the Chinese defeat, the historical relations between Korea and China began to 
wane and officially ended at last in 1910 when Japan forcibly annexed Korea. The Yi 
dynasty’s relations with both the Ming and Ching dynasties as well as the two Chinese 
dynasties’ impact on Choson will be examined in this section. 
The relations of the Yi dynasty with the Ming dynasty occurred from the 
beginning of the Yi dynasty. Soon after Yi Song-gye usurped the throne of the Koryo 
dynasty in 1392, he set up a tributary relationship with the Ming dynasty, requested a 
name for his new dynasty from the Ming emperor Hung Wu, received the name of 
Choson, and appointed Confucianism as a ruling ideology unlike the Koryo dynasty that 
emphasized Buddhism. In addition, the Yi dynasty adopted the Chinese-style 
examination system for its bureaucracy, which was “closely patterned on those of China, 
and the subject matter consisted almost entirely of the Chinese classics, histories, and 
belles-lettres.”37 Unfortunately, however, Confucianism played a key role on making the 
relations between them such a suzerain-subject relationship as “Confucian doctrines of 
hierarchy in the Choson dynasty…informed a foreign policy known as ‘serving the great’ 
(sadae), that great thing being China - and not just China, but China of the Ming.”38 
Meanwhile, because the Choson court refused the Japanese proposal that the 
Koreans attack the Ming dynasty together with them or give a free passage to them, 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi whose ambition was to attack the Ming dynasty through the Korean 
peninsula invaded Korea with about 150,000 Japanese possessing firearms in the spring 
of 1592. When the Japanese forces took Seoul within two weeks after the onset of the 
Japanese invasion, the king and court were forced by the Japanese troops to move toward 
Uiju on the Yalu River.39 In the face of the Japanese fierce attacks launched from both 
the sea and land, admiral Yi Sun-shin who invented “the world’s first ironclad ships”, 
called Geobukseon (turtle-shaped battle ship) in Korean, defeated Japanese naval forces 
composed of about 250 ships in the sea warfare. With the aid of about 50,000 troops who 
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the Ming dynasty dispatched, the Choson dynasty was finally able to repel the Japanese 
invasions via land warfare as well.40 The Imjin War, lasted from 1592 to 1598, but the 
Japanese invasion was an unmitigated disaster for Korea. As the Japanese “covered our 
whole eight provinces and ravaged them…seized our three capitals and desecrated two 
royal tombs…burned our ancestral temple and other sacred places,”41 the central 
government of Choson was weakened and the life of its people deteriorated, causing 
destruction of its cultural treasures and monuments as well as agriculture. In addition, 
“Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea also speeded the political and military disintegration of 
Ming China, which was soon to be tested by new invasions from the north [or the 
Manchu state].”42  
Between the late 16th and early 17th centuries, meanwhile, Nurhachi first united 
the Jurchen tribes, and then consolidated both the Mongols and Chinese, and finally 
founded the Manchu state. Thereafter, Abahai, Nurhachi’s son, invaded Choson in 1627 
and 1637, and named his dynasty the Ching in 1636. As a result of these invasions, the Yi 
dynasty established tributary relations with the Manchu or Ching dynasty in 1637 and 
maintained them until 1910. Among historically significant events in the relations 
between them are the contacts of the Koreans with Western civilization and the Sino-
Japanese War.  
First, in the 17th century, the Koreans had a chance to have contact with the Jesuit 
scholars, Christian missionaries, and Western science through the correspondence of the 
Korean tribute missions to Peking. Maps of Europe, for example, works on Catholicism, 
Christianity, Western sciences, geography, and astronomy in Chinese translation, and 
Dutch Weltevree’s knowledge of cannon casting were introduced into Choson by them 
between the late 16th and the 17th century.43 The flow of Western scientific ideas and 
knowledge into Choson gave rise to a vigorous intellectual movement, the so-called 
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Sirhak (Western Learning or Pragmatic Learning), on the peninsula. Sirhak scholars, who 
were eager for administrative and economic reform as well as Western science and 
technology, were pioneers to “rationalize the civil service examination system, the 
foundation of the bureaucracy…[and] to build up industry, technology, and commerce.”44 
Even though it had been transmitted to Choson by the Koreans through the relations of 
tribute missions between Korea and China and later was suppressed by factions against it, 
it paradoxically continued to raise “the growing awareness of Korea as a separate entity 
from China” in late Choson society.45   
Second, the coup led by pro-Japan reformers in 1884 caused a clash between the 
Chinese and Japanese soldiers. In order to avoid such a clash, “at the Li-Ito Convention 
(1885), the Japanese proposed that both Japanese and Chinese troops withdraw from 
Korea; and that each side would inform the other if it decided to send troops to the 
peninsula.”46 Subsequently the Treaty of Tientsin including these stipulations was signed 
in the same year between the Chinese statesman Li Hung-chang and the Japanese Prime 
Minister Ito Hirobumi. “In 1894,” however, “when the outbreak of a domestic rebellion 
[called the Tonghak Movement] threatened the Korean king, both China and Japan seized 
the opportunity to send troops to protect the royal family.”47 After all this, in July of 
1894, the Sino-Japanese War began with the Japanese declaration of war on China. 
During the Sino-Japanese War, the Korean people participating in the Tonghak 
Movement for a while succeeded in attacking the Japanese forces and supply bases, but 
the Japanese soldiers brutally suppressed the Tonghak Movement around January 1895. 
The Sino-Japanese War ended with a complete Japanese victory over the Chinese in the 
spring of 1895 as well. As a result of Japan’s victory over China, the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki was signed between Li Hung-chang and Ito Hirobumi, similar to the Treaty 
of Tientsin. Not to mention both the cession of Taiwan and opening of more ports to 
Japan, through the Treaty of Shimonoseki, “Japan obtained from China the Liaotung 
Peninsula, Formosa, the Pescadores [Islands], and an indemnity of twenty thousand gold 
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taels.”48 In addition, the treaty “was to serve as the springboard for a new round of 
imperialist advances that seriously threatened Chinese sovereignty.”49 The terms of the 
treaty “were disastrous for China … China had to recognize ‘the full and complete 
independence and autonomy of Korea,’ which, under the circumstances, effectively made 
Korea a Japanese protectorate.”50  
After its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, the Ching dynasty tried to make some 
reforms such as the Tongzhi Restoration, the Self-Strengthening, and the Hundred Days 
movements. However, the failure of these reforms led the provincial armies’ leaders not 
to obey the Ching dynasty, which could not control them well. Eventually, the growth of 
political and military regionalism made the 1911 revolution and political fragmentation 
possible, so that the Ching dynasty finally collapsed in 1911. “The uprising of October 
10, 1911, which led to the establishment of the Republic of China (ROC) on January 1, 
1912, was the culmination of a protracted ideological, political, and military struggle in 
China and internationally.”51 Soon after the Sino-Japanese War, meanwhile, the conflicts 
between Russia and Japan continued to mount because of each’s interests in Manchuria 
and Korea. Eventually the Russo-Japanese War began in 1904 when Japan attacked Port 
Arthur in Manchuria first, and Japan defeated Russia in both land warfare and especially 
naval battles. It ended in 1905 with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth.52 Thereafter, 
obtaining supremacy on the Korean peninsula through the treaty, Japan forcibly annexed 
Korea in August of 1910. In other words, the relations between Korea and China 
officially ended at last as soon as the Yi dynasty of 519 years was over in 1910. 
 
E. JAPANESE ANNEXATION AND THE TWO KOREAS (1910-1948) 
The relations between Korea and China that lasted for about 2,000 years and 
Chinese long-lasting influence over the Korean peninsula began to wane after the defeat 
of China in the Sino-Japanese War during 1894-1895. Such relations were officially 
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ended at a time when Japan forcibly annexed Korea in 1910. During the Japanese 
annexation period from 1910 to 1945, it was thought that it was unlikely to sustain the 
relations between Koreans and China under the Japanese protectorate to Korea. 
Nevertheless, even though the Sino-Korean relations were very thin and rare, they 
continued to exist. 
In order to avoid the Japanese repression soon after the 1919 March 1st 
Independence Movement that occurred throughout the Korean peninsula against Japanese 
colonialism, the Korean independence fighters moved to China proper.  
The Chinese at that time, more than a decade before the Wanpaoshan 
incident, appeared to be sympathetic to independence movements and well 
disposed to the Koreans. Thus it was that the Shanghai Korean community 
finally decided to set up the Korean Provisional Government, a nationalist 
government in exile.53  
Thus, the Korean provisional government was established in Shanghai, China on April 
13, 1919 at last to fight against the Japanese colonial forces and then ultimately to regain 
independence from Japan.54   
In fact, China or the Republic of China (ROC) harbored “the Korean 
independence fighters during the Japanese colonial period and [provided] support to the 
Korean provisional government established in Shanghai and later moved to Chungking 
during the period of the Sino-Japanese War [in the late 1930s].”55 After moving to 
Chungking, “the provisional capital of the Chinese Nationalist government,” the Korean 
provisional government  
organized the Korean independence army with the financial support of the 
Chinese government…Although the Korean force was small in China, 
together with the Chinese army it waged a determined fight against the 
Japanese for the independence of Korea.56  
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During World War II, in addition, the Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek 
advocated that Korea be granted independence after the war at the Cairo conference in 
December of 1943.  
After the Allies, especially the U.S., victory over the Japanese troops in World 
War Two in August 1945, however, the United States and the Soviet Union began 
increasing their influence on the Korean peninsula by having their troops stationed in 
Korea under the name of eliminating the remaining Japanese troops on the peninsula. 
Consequently two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, which had just 
substituted for the Japanese influence after the long-lasting role of China in Korea, 
blocked the Chinese second bid on the peninsula. As a result of the escalation of the Cold 
War between the two superpowers during the second half of the 1940s, unfortunately, 
Korea was partitioned into two Koreas: the ROK was officially founded on August 15, 
1948 under the United States’ patronage through a U.N.-backed vote, whereas the DPRK 
was proclaimed on September 9, 1948 under that of the Soviet Union. Just as the two 
Koreas did in 1948, in addition, China would have the same fate as the two Koreas a year 
later. 
 
F. SUMMARY: CHINA’S IMPACT ON KOREA UNTIL 1948 
Although the first relations of Korea with China in the status of a state-to-a state 
bond originated from China’s four commanderies, a sort of colony, influence over the 
Korean peninsula in about 108 B.C., Chinese did not directly rule over the 
commanderies. Besides, even though Korean people had autonomous rights to some large 
extent during that period, they--especially the Koguryo people--never gave up attempts at 
struggling with China to achieve independence and their endeavors finally brought the 
Chinese commanderies to an end in 313 A.D. However, it was definitely through the era 
of Chinese commanderies in Korea that the Koreans were also able to have contact with 
Chinese developed civilization including iron culture, such as Britons enjoyed Roman 
culture in the ancient times. This generative power helped to create three native kingdoms 
and later the unification of the three kingdoms by Silla.  
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After repelling the Chinese commanderies, Koguryo established tributary 
relations with the neighboring Chinese. The reason is because Koguryo needed Chinese 
advanced civilization to acquire such things as religious, political and cultural systems, so 
that it would prosper and defend itself from powerful neighbors’ invasions, and attain 
unification. To obtain them from China, it was indispensable that Koguryo had relations 
with such powerful Chinese neighbors. During the three kingdoms period, Paekche and 
Silla strived to create an alliance with a Chinese dynasty for the same reasons as 
Koguryo. Through such processes, they naturally accepted a whole slew of Chinese 
cultural innovations and each of them also tried to take the best advantage of those 
innovations for becoming the most powerful country among them.  
When Tang generals tried to hold sway over the whole Korean peninsula right 
after Silla unified the three kingdoms in 668 with the Tang dynasty’s aid, a unified Silla 
repelled their ambition through war. Nevertheless, Silla set up a tributary but autonomous 
relationship with the Tang dynasty in order to maintain amicable relations, and at the 
same time, to import Chinese developed political, economic, and cultural systems, and 
eventually to become prosperous.  
Lasting for about 470 years after the collapse of unified Silla, the Koryo dynasty 
established a centralized government on the basis of Chinese political institutions, and 
flourished through the cultural and economic exchanges with the Chinese Sung dynasty. 
After the collapse of the Sung, however, Koryo suffered from such non-Chinese 
dynasties as Khitan and Jurchen dynasty, and the Mongol empire during a large part of 
Koryo. As a result, Koryo had no choice but to establish tributary relations with Chinese 
or non-Chinese dynasties vis-à-vis their incessant invasions. Nevertheless, although 
Koryo was severely threatened by economic suffering, and political and spiritual 
oppression, during the 110 year era of the Mongol conquest over Koreans after fights 
between Koryo and Mongol peoples for 40 years, the Koryo people never totally became 
sinicized--unlike the fact that such non-Chinese peoples as the Mongols and Manchus 
became very assimilated into the civilized Chinese cultures and systems and then 
sinicized. Instead, Koryo people, 
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resurrected themselves from destruction by neighboring states, and used 
adversity as a springboard to new heights of civilization. This was a 
recurring pattern in the history of Korea.57 
During the Yi dynasty, Choson established a tributary relationship with the Ming 
dynasty and later the Ching dynasty.  
Unlike the Mongol Empire of Yuan China, Ming respected the 
independence of Korea and never interfered with Korean politics. They 
never violated each other’s borders.58  
The amicable relations between the Ming and Yi dynasty was a main driving force to 
repel the Japanese forces when Japan invaded Korea in 1592. In addition, it contributed 
to Choson’s ability to achieve cultural development and internal prosperity particularly 
under the ruling period of King Se Jong (1418-1450): e.g., the Hangeul or Korean 
alphabet was invented under the support of King Se Jong.  
The Chinese hardly received a big welcome on the peninsula, however, at 
least after the Ming dynasty fell to the Manchus. Korea was indeed a 
tributary state to China, but it had not always been so.59  
Although the Ching dynasty’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese war gave rise to the Japanese 
colonization of Korea during the next 36 years, China harbored the Korean provisional 
government during that period and the Korean independence fighters were able to 
achieve their independence at last in 1945. 
Almost all dynasties of Korea had no choice but to establish tributary relations 
with those of China because Korean dynasties could not afford to continue to fight 
against incessant invasions of much more powerful neighbors: Yen, Han, Sui, Tang, Liao 
(Khitans), Chin (Jurchens), Mongol empire, and Ching (Manchus). As for Korean 
dynasties, the tributary relations did not mean a token of unconditional obedience to 
Chinese dynasties, but a token of peace, survival, prosperity, and, at times, a passage for 
Western civilization. In other words, in spite of the tributary relations between the Sino-
Korean dynasties, “Korea was fully autonomous, free to maintain relations with any 
country so long as such relations did not conflict with its tributary obligations to 
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China.”60 Korean dynasties could keep their peace with China, maintain the ability to 
import an advanced civilization from China, and also develop their own creative culture 
through such a tributary system.  
The Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and Japanese annexation of 
Choson in 1910 resulted in the decline of the Chinese influence over the Korean 
peninsula, but the 1945 Allies’ victory over Japan in World War Two made the Sino-
Korean relationships become entangled with the two superpowers, the United States and 
the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War era. 
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III. THE TWO KOREAS AND THE PRC IN THE COLD WAR ERA 
Throughout the United States’ modern history in East Asia, “the basic East Asian 
policy structure of the United States has been consistent…for about a century and a half, 
from the open door policy toward China in the nineteenth century: to prevent the rise of 
any hegemonic power in the region.”61 Especially since the Korean War armistice and 
the U.S.-ROK alliance in 1953, the ROK has maintained a bilateral security treaty only 
with the United States. In addition, because the U.S. main interest on the Korean 
peninsula has been to defend South Korean sovereignty against an attack by North Korea, 
Washington was enthusiastic about helping Seoul with economic and military assistance 
and Seoul had depended solely on U.S. aid until the mid-1960s. However, Seoul began 
relying on Japanese economic and technology aid after the 1965 ROK-Japan 
normalization in the face of Korean historical antagonism against Japan. Overcoming 
Seoul’s dependence on Washington and Tokyo, throughout the Cold War era, “South 
Korea in the 1980s appeared to be joining Japan as an economic rival of the United 
States.”62 Thus, “the basic character of bilateral relations between Seoul and Washington 
has been transformed from an asymmetrical dependence to a growing 
interdependence.”63  
From the beginning of the Cold War in Asia, on the other hand, the PRC’s 
bilateral relations with the DPRK and the Soviet Union stemmed mostly from security 
interests against the U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan alliances. After the Sino-Soviet border 
clashes in 1969 and the Sino-U.S. rapprochement in 1972, however, Beijing tried to woo 
Pyongyang to stand away from the Soviet Union as well as to maintain friendly relations 
with it because “China’s basic interest during and after the cold war has been to make  
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certain that no other power ever again acquires a dominant position in the [Korean] 
peninsula.”64 However, as relations between Beijing and Moscow fluctuated, it had a 
deep impact on the two countries’ bilateral relations with Pyongyang.   
While the Cold War came close to the end, “as North Korea treads cautiously 
between Moscow and Beijing to retain its independence, South Korea is attempting to 
reduce its military and diplomatic dependence on the United States and its economic 
dependence on Japan.”65 Above all, since Deng Xiaoping embarked upon an open door 
policy emphasizing Chinese modernization, especially economic development from the 
late 1970s on, the PRC-ROK relations have been growing remarkably. In this chapter, the 
main causes of the Cold War in Asia will be briefly assessed, and then Seoul-
Washington, Beijing-Pyongyang, and Seoul-Beijing bilateral relations will be probed 
throughout the Cold War era. 
 
A. THE MAIN CAUSES OF THE COLD WAR IN ASIA 
After the end of World War Two in 1945, the United States--contemplating the 
Soviet Union’s efforts to spread Communism especially in Eastern Europe (e.g. in 
Turkey, Greece and Iran)--announced the Truman Doctrine in March of 1947, launched 
the Marshall Plan in 1948, and organized the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) in mid-1949 on the European continent. In part this was in order to contain the 
Soviet Union’s power because both European recovery through the Marshall Plan and 
stable European security through NATO could contribute to U.S. national interests and 
expanding democracy, i.e., preventing communism from prevailing in Europe through the 
Truman Doctrine as well. In fact, these U.S. measures in Europe were well underway and 
were working effectively. In addition, when the Soviet Union’s blockade of West Berlin 
had taken place from June 1948 through May 1949, the United States was able to succeed 
in containing the Soviet Union’s power in Europe with a superiority of strategic arms 
such as a number of B-29 bombers and atomic bombs as well as the superiority of its 
economy. “Indeed, Stalin’s primary concern at this time was his vulnerability to the 
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West’s nuclear advantage.”66 However, the Soviet Union successfully tested its first 
atomic bomb in 1949, “which shattered the American monopoly on the weapon widely 
regarded as the principal deterrent against a Soviet attack.”67 As a result of the Soviet 
Union’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1949, it pushed the United States to take a step 
toward the drafting and promotion of NSC-68 and it also indirectly caused the Korean 
War in 1950 to take place in Asia.  
To make matters worse, due to the United States’ announcement of “the 
termination of all economic and military assistance to Chang Kai-shek”68 in August 1949 
in the wake of his government’s corruption and inefficiency, Mao Zedong “with the aid 
of large stores of captured Japanese weapons turned over to him by the Russians as their 
occupation forces withdrew from Manchuria”69 by the autumn of 1946 was eventually 
able to announce the founding of the PRC on October 1, 1949. Even though the Soviet 
Union did not regard Mao Zedong and the CCP as the legitimate leader and party in 
China throughout the Chinese civil war, it was “the establishment in October 1949 of the 
People’s Republic of China, a Communist state comprising a quarter of the world’s 
population that promptly became a military ally and economic beneficiary of the Soviet 
Union”70 that changed Moscow’s view. After Mao visited the Soviet Union at the end of 
1949 and signed a thirty-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance with 
Stalin in February 1950, which “was directed at Japan and, implicitly, at the United 
States”71 their ties were strengthened. From then on, the United States had to confront the 
two largest communist countries in the world, the Soviet Union and the PRC at the same 
time in the cold war in Asia, particularly in the Korean War and the Vietnam War. 
Therefore, both the U.S. policy shift toward China in favor of the CCP, though not 
intended, and the establishment of the PRC in the second half of 1949 played a key role 
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in the proliferation of the cold war in Asia because if the Chinese Nationalist government 
had won in the Chinese civil war, it would be impossible that such a series of communist 
expansions in Asia as “China’s annexation of neighboring Tibet, a treaty of friendship 
between China and the Soviet Union, and the invasion of South Korea by communist 
North Korea” would take place.72  
In sum, the Cold War in Asia began to emerge in 1949 when the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) was established on October 1 and the Soviet Union tested its 
first nuclear bombs, and it resulted from the U.S. policy shift, i.e., disengagement toward 
the pro-democracy Chang Kai-sek government, and the Soviet Union’s ambitions of 
expanding communism by using the PRC as the bastion of that mission in Asia. 
Therefore, the Soviet Union’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1949 and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP)’s victory over the Nationalist Party (Kuo Min Tang or KMT) in 
the Chinese civil war in the same year played a crucial role in the advent of the Cold War 
in Asia. These two big events resulted in “a permanent and fundamental alteration in the 
shape of international relations” as well as “an equally permanent and fundamental 
change in American policy.”73 
 
B. THE ROK’S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 
In 1882 a treaty establishing diplomatic relations between the United States and 
Korea (which was at the time known as “the Land of the Morning Calm” by the Western 
countries) was signed in Tientsin, with China “acting as intermediary.” More than twenty 
years later the Taft-Katsura agreement between the United States and Japan in 1905 
enabled Japan to establish a Japanese protectorate in Korea. In return, Japan had to 
acquiesce in the United States’ acquisition of the Philippines.74 As a part of the results, 
Koreans severely suffered psychologically and physically from the Japanese atrocities 
during the 36 years from 1910 to 1945. Meanwhile, during World War II, the allies 
considered the Korean issue at several conferences. President Roosevelt and British 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden agreed in March 1943 that an international trusteeship 
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Russia.75 President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and the Chinese 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek decided at the Cairo Conference in November 1943 that 
Korea shall become free and independent after the war.76 It was determined at the 
Teheran Conference attended by Roosevelt, Churchill and the Soviet Union’s leader 
Stalin in November 1943 that the Koreans would need “forty years” as a “period of 
apprenticeship before full independence might be attained.”77 Roosevelt, Churchill, and 
Stalin “reiterated the agreement previously reached in Cairo about the principle of 
Korea’s independence” at the Potsdam Conference held in July 1945.78  
Soon after the Japanese unconditional surrender to the United States in August 
1945, the provisions regarding Korea declared at the Cairo and Potsdam conferences 
immediately came into effect, but the United States and the Soviet Union (in return for 
the Soviet declaration of war on Japan just six day before Japan’s surrender) reached an 
agreement that “Russian troops should occupy Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel, 
while those of the United States should occupy the area south of it” in order to get rid of 
the remaining Japanese troops on the peninsula.79 Contemporarily, the Cold War between 
the two superpowers was getting more intense. Unfortunately, as a result, Korea was 
partitioned into two Koreas under a respectively different ideology: the ROK was 
officially founded on August 15, 1948 under the United States’ patronage, whereas the 
DPRK was proclaimed on September 9, 1948 under that of the Soviet Union.  
After respective declarations of the two Koreas, meanwhile, “the last Soviet 
forces were withdrawn in March 1949 and the Americans…followed suit in June.”80 To 
make matters worse, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s speech approved by 
                                                 
75 Anthony Eden. The Memoirs of Anthony Eden: The Reckoning. Boston, Massachusetts.: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1965. p. 438. 
76 US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Paper, Conferences at 
Cairo and Teheran. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1961. pp. 399-404. 
77 Robert E. Sherwood. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History. New York: Harper, 1948. p. 
777. 
78 Sung-Po Chu. “Sino-Korean Relations: Retrospect and Prospect.” Foreign Policy of the Republic of 
China on Taiwan: An Unorthodox Approach. Yu San Wang (Ed.) New York: Praeger, 1990. p. 65 
79 Woo-keun Han. The History of Korea. Grafton K. Mintz. (Ed.) Seoul: East-West Center Press, 
1970. p. 498. 
80 Michael Yahuda. The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995. London and New York: 
Routledge Curzon, 1997. p. 118. 
35 
President Truman was delivered at the National Press Club in January 1950, which 
excluded South Korea from the U.S. defense line in the Pacific area, stretching from the 
Aleutian Islands, through Japan, the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa), the Philippines to 
Australia and New Zealand. The 1949 U.S. troops withdrawal from the ROK and the 
subsequent Acheson speech instigated Kim Il Sung to consult with Stalin about his 
intention to invade South Korea and Kim eventually got permission and support from 
Stalin.81 As a result, the Korean War began in June 1950, in which the U.S. military 
casualties reached almost 140,000. However, the war contributed to the cementing of 
U.S.-ROK ties. About two months after General Harrison, for the United Nations, and 
General Nam Il, for the Chinese and North Koreans, signed the Armistice Agreement on 
July 27, 1953,82 the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty was signed on October 1, 1953 and 
then entered into force from November 17, 1954. Since then, this treaty has been “the 
pillar of the ROK’s security and national strategy” as well as “an institutional guarantee 
for the USFK to be stationed in Korea to deter another war in the Korean peninsula, and 
[provide] a legal ground for the combined defense.”83  
Even though the number of the U.S. military personnel was remarkably and 
gradually reduced “from over 200,000 in 1954 to 73,000 in 1955, and were cut below 
60,000 by 1960”, the U.S. government made every endeavor to rehabilitate the ROK 
ruined during the war period and to develop its military forces because it believed that 
“improved economic conditions and an enhanced sense of security would pay off in 
increased political stability and effectiveness.”84 Nevertheless, the ROK’s major 
economic development was not begun until General Park Chung Hee came to power after 
a successful military coup led by him in 1961. The reasons that Park decided to wage a 
military coup to overthrow the civilian government were as follows: President Rhee Syng  
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Man’s regime (1948-1960) did not dedicate its efforts to recover war-torn South Korea, 
instead, it depended heavily on the economic aid from the United Nations and especially 
the United States. 
During the period 1953-1960 the United States provided approximately 
$1.7 billion of aid to Korea. The United Nations Korea Reconstruction 
Agency also provided $122 million in aid, 70 percent of which was 
contributed to the United Nations by the United States.85  
President Rhee’s personal autocracy and corruption (especially, the 1960 electoral 
depravity) lead to South Korean demonstrations breaking out, which eventually forced 
President Rhee to resign. After President Rhee’s resignation in 1960, the short-lived, 
inconsequential Yun Bo Sun administration (August 1960-May 1961) and the 
premiership of Chang Myon encouraged South Korean peoples’ protests to take place as 
well. Eventually, under this unstable political situation, General Park Chung Hee led a 
military coup against a burgeoning government on May 16, 1961. 
After his inauguration, President Park Chung Hee was anxiously willing to 
develop South Korea’s economy and to upgrade its military defense capability, in order 
to obtain enhanced self-defense ability against North Korea. To achieve President Park’s 
main purposes, the Basic Relations Treaty was signed between the ROK and Japan in 
June 1965 for the purposes of obtaining economic aid from Japan and reinforcing U.S. 
approval of his legitimacy as the ROK President, regardless of most of Koreans’ 
opposition to normalization with Japan due to Korean historical animosity toward the 
Japanese. To this day the ROK and Japan remain averse to a bilateral defense treaty. In 
the mid-1960s, in addition, the Park government took the bold action of sending ROK 
troops as a close and friendly ally of Americans--as well as businessmen and civilian 
workers--to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) or South Vietnam, and consequently about 
“312,000 South Korean troops were deployed to Vietnam” from the mid-1960s to 1973. 
As a result, “It is estimated that the United States paid more than $ 10 billion for the 
South Korean troops, including $ 3.16 billion in military assistance since 1966.”86 
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President Park’s 1965 decision to dispatch its troops to South Vietnam became part of the 
motivating power of the ROK’s rapid economic development dubbed “the Miracle of the 
Han River.” Just as the Korean War helped rehabilitate Japan defeated in World War 
Two, so did the Vietnam War further the development of the ROK economy devastated 
during the Korean War. It also helped to develop and elevate relations between the 
United States and the ROK because, at that time, the United States was seeking to gain 
international support for its war on behalf of South Vietnam struggling against 
communist North Vietnam. By then, in fact, the ROK had heavily counted on U.S. 
economic and military aid since 1953. For example, U.S. economic aid accounted for 
about “5% of South Korea’s total gross national product” and its aid--including both 
economic and military aid--had provided “nearly 10% of South Korea’s GNP” from 1954 
to 1970.87 
Relations between the two countries became strained by virtue of an 
announcement of the Nixon doctrine (or the Guam doctrine) during the first half of the 
1970s and due to the Carter administration’s U.S. military pullout plan from the Korean 
peninsula during the second half of the decade. The tense U.S.-ROK relations urged the 
ROK and Japan to cooperate together due to the two countries’ security concern vis-à-vis 
North Korea and about the U.S. troop withdrawal plan from the ROK. First, the Nixon 
doctrine, enunciated on Guam in July 1969, was a new security policy for the United 
States in Asia. “Henceforth,” according to the doctrine, “its allies would be expected to 
do the bulk of the ground fighting while the Americans would contribute with their navy 
and air force from off-shore as well as with military supplies and military training.”88 
This doctrine had a great impact particularly on two countries’ security: South Vietnam 
and South Korea.  
In line with the Nixon doctrine American military personnel in Asia were 
decreased from 727, 300 in January 1969 to 284, 000 by December 1971. 
The cuts were most evident in Vietnam.89  
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As an aftermath of the doctrine, a joint communiqué between the ROK-U.S. governments 
regarding the U.S. withdrawal from the Korean peninsula was issued in February 1971 
after, in July 1970, the U.S. government decided to withdraw some of its troops from the 
Korean peninsula. It concluded a reduction of twenty thousand U.S. troops resulting from 
“the deactivation of the American Seventh Infantry Division from the reserve position, 
removal of three Air Force squadrons, and the pullback of the Second Infantry Division 
from front-line positions along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).”90 It also included the 
U.S. military assistance program at the value of $1.5 billion that would last for five years 
“to modernize the ROK military and eventually facilitate the total withdrawal of U.S. 
forces from Korea.”91 Second, President Carter’s pullout plan was released in 1977 after 
the fall of Saigon in April 1975. His plan’s main purpose was a complete U.S. troop 
withdrawal from South Korea by 1982. Its details included the immediate pullout of one 
combat brigade (six thousand troops) of the Second Infantry Division by 1978; the 
withdrawal of a second brigade and all noncombat support personnel (nine thousand 
troops) by 1980; and the complete withdrawal of remaining personnel, U.S. headquarters, 
and nuclear weapons by 1982.92 In addition, it was strongly believed that President Carter 
whose administration emphasized human rights in U.S. policy linked problematic human 
rights issues under the Park regime (1961-1979) with his pullout plan. However, Carter 
eventually suspended his withdrawal plan in 1979 because of “a combination of 
congressional pressure, revised intelligence assessments of North Korea, and criticism 
from Asian allies.”93 Seoul, in return, signed an agreement with Washington “to raise its 
defense burden to 6% of GNP” in June 1979.94    
In the late 1970s, relations between the two counties became cool due to the 
second coup led by General Chun Doo Hwan in December 1979. It was remarkably 
different from the first anti-government coup led by Park Chung Hee against a nine 
month old inept Yun Bo Sun government right after the 1960 resignation of corrupt 
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President Rhee Syng Man because the second one was an intra-military coup and then 
subsequently helped make General Chun the ROK President. However, during the 1980s, 
especially the period “in which Chun and Reagan overlapped …South Korea’s 
confidence in the U.S. commitment to Korea…was at a new high, U.S.-R.O.K. economic 
ties blossomed so that U.S. economic and military aid were no longer necessary and were 
terminated [in 1979], and, for most of the period, U.S. tolerance for Seoul’s political 
excesses was great indeed.”95   
After the assassination of Park Chung Hee by Kim Jae Kyu, the then director of 
the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), on October 26, 1979 and an intra-
military coup led by General Chun on December 12, 1979, the Kwangju Democratic 
Movement (kwangju min ju hwa un dong) took place, in which students and workers in 
Kwangju city made a feverishly fierce demonstration for real democracy and at the same 
time against a group of new military powers ruling over the ROK in the face of the 
President Choi Kyu Ha government (October 1979-August 1980). Nevertheless Chun 
came to power in August 1980 in the wake of the Kwangju atrocities in May 1980 
through the process of ruthlessly and brutally quelling the movement. Under this 
circumstance, “Acceptance of the Chun Doo Hwan government by the South Korean 
people [could have] been enhanced by the extent to which the regime has been able to 
generate support from its key allies, the United States and Japan.”96 At this point, because 
President Chun became one of the first heads of state to be invited by President Reagan to 
Washington on February 1981 after the conservative Ronald Regan took office in January 
1981, the Chun government could receive extensive support from South Korean people 
as well as the U.S. leadership at last. In addition, the Reagan-Chun summit in 1981 
proclaimed that “U.S. combat forces would remain indefinitely in Korea” and that the 
United States would resume “the previously suspended security consultative conferences 
(SCC) dialogue between defense departments” and would reinstitute the annual U.S.-
ROK Team Spirit joint military exercises that were initiated in 1976.97  
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In terms of U.S.-ROK trade in the 1980s, South Korea became a significant 
trading partner of the United States as a result of Park Chung Hee’s enthusiasm for 
fostering export-oriented industries since 1962. The U.S.-ROK trade volume came to 
about $32 billion in 1988 but “the size of the bilateral trade imbalance…rose to a near 
$10 billion level in South Korea’s favor in 1987.”98 As a result, trade frictions between 
Seoul and Washington ensued from the U.S. trade deficit, which caused the United States 
to take such strong actions as the U.S. Super 301 Clause as well as the U.S. coercive 
demand for opening up the ROK agricultural sector to reduce the trade deficit. Such U.S. 
actions became a main factor bringing about anti-Americanism in South Korea. “In the 
1980s, because of the alleged American implications in the Kwangju incident and 
growing bilateral trade frictions, the rise of anti-Americanism in South Korea added a 
new dimension to the Seoul-Washington alliance.”99 
In the meantime, Roh Tae Woo, Chun Doo Hwan’s close friend and colleague in 
the ROK Military Academy, was selected as a new president in 1987 through the first 
direct presidential election by the South Korean people and succeeded Chun in 1988. As 
he emphasized his Northern Policy in the 1987 campaign pledges and his 1988 inaugural 
address, President Roh issued, on July 7, 1988, a declaration regarding the Northern 
policy known as the ‘July 7 Declaration’ that “South Korea will seek common prosperity 
with the North based on the concept of a single community and, while helping the North 
improve relations with friendly noncommunist nations, will try to normalise its own 
relations with China, the Soviet Union, and other communist countries.”100 
Consequently, with the U.S. backing of President Roh Tae Woo’s Nordpolitik, South 
Korea was able to establish diplomatic relation with Hungary in September 1988 during 
the Seoul Olympics period, and then with Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, 
and Mongolia by 1990. “The approval and support of Seoul’s allies, especially the United 
States,” in fact, “has been essential for South Korea to pursue its Nordpolitik 
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initiatives.”101 Above all, with Washington’s patronage, summit talks between President 
Roh and Mikhail Gorbachev could be held in San Francisco during Gorbachev’s state 
visit to the United States in June 1990. Finally it caused Moscow-Seoul formal relations 
to be established on September 30, 1990. Ironically, however, the increasing 
development of Seoul’s relations with Communist states, in particular the Soviet Union 
and the PRC, seems to cause its economic and security dependence on the United States 
to dwindle in the post-Cold War era. 
 
C. THE PRC’S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE DPRK   
After overcoming more than a century of humiliation from the West and Japan 
since the Opium War in the 19th century and achieving the 1949 nation-wide victory over 
the Kuo Min Tang (KMT or the Nationalist Party) in a civil war lasting for several 
decades, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadres were able to completely achieve 
China’s sovereignty. Thereafter, the PRC was proclaimed by Mao Zedong on October 1, 
1949 and set up diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level with the DPRK in the 
same year. Above all, on the other hand, the PRC--right after its establishment--needed 
economic aid and military technology from the Soviet Union to reconstruct and recover 
in the post-civil war period. China proper was heavily devastated during the civil war that 
had lasted since the 1920s and during the war with Japan. Soviet aid also was needed to 
unify with Taiwan--into which Generalissimo Chang Kai-shek’s government fled after 
the defeat of his Nationalist Party by Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party--and for 
the purpose of integrating and stabilizing people’s opinions within the PRC. The PRC’s 
need for Soviet assistance, in other words, resulted from political instability and 
particularly economic hardship that had been getting worse during the several decades 
long fratricidal civil war. Therefore, less than six month after establishing the PRC, Mao 
Zedong “was persuaded to sign on February 14, 1950, a thirty-year Treaty of Friendship, 
Alliance, and Mutual Assistance [with the Soviet Union] that was directed at Japan and, 
implicitly, at the United States.”102  
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Although it is, in general, believed that this treaty between the PRC and the Soviet 
Union played a crucial role in the PRC’s making a decision to enter the Korean War on 
the DPRK’s side in early October of 1950, when UN forces crossed the 38th parallel and 
marched toward the Yalu, there are some other crucial factors. These include the PRC’s 
physical security, especially with regard to the strategically and economically important 
Manchuria; the CCP leaders’ intention to win a glorious victory in Korea in order to 
enhance communist control of China’s state and society as well as to promote China’s 
international prestige and influence; and a moral responsibility in terms of the Confucian 
point of view. The last factor resulted from the fact that “Many Korean patriots who had 
escaped to China during the Japanese occupation of Korea (1910-1945) participated in 
the civil war on the side of the Chinese communists, which the Chinese communists 
gratefully acknowledged.”103 In addition, when Lin Biao’s communist forces in South 
Manchuria were defeated by Kuo Min Tang (the Nationalist Party) troops in late 1946 
and then most of them fled into North Korea, Kim Il Sung helped them by providing 
camps until they returned to China. “Moreover, the Northeast Field Army (predecessor of 
the Forth Field Army) [created just before the Korean War broke out] recruited thousands 
of soldiers of Korean nationality living in Northeast China, and most of these were 
subsequently transferred to the North Korean army.”104 When the U.S. military 
intervention in Korea and the U.S. Seventh Fleet’s movement to the Taiwan Strait soon 
after the outbreak of the Korean War endangered Chinese security interests, Mao ordered 
the CCP’s Central Military Commission (CMC) to establish the Northeast Border 
Defense Army (NEBDA) about two weeks after the onset of the war. “In mid-July 
[1950], in accordance with Mao’s ideas of crisis management, the CCP leadership 
initiated the ‘Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea,’ starting to fit the 
entire country to a war orbit.”105 The PRC, encouraged by the Soviet Union, at last 
entered the Korean War with numerous and valuable manpower of the Chinese People’s 
Volunteers (CPV) when UN forces crossed the 38th parallel and marched toward the Yalu 
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River in early October 1950. Although the PRC suffered numerous casualties in the 
Korean War, it could revive the Chinese pride humiliated by the Western powers and 
Japan during about 100 years in the international arena since the Opium War of 1840. It 
also could maintain and enhance the CCP’s revolution in the domestic arena through the 
Korean War. 
During the 1950s, the PRC and DPRK enjoyed the inseparable blood ties 
cemented during the Korean War in the face of Moscow’s attempts to exert influence 
over both Beijing and Pyongyang in return for Soviet economic assistance to them. After 
the end of the Korean War, the PRC became a second benefactor for the DPRK compared 
to the Soviet Union in terms of capabilities for both economic and military technology 
assistance. China did this in spite of its severe casualties including around 152,000 deaths 
and about 230,000 wounded soldiers out of 1.35 million Chinese forces participating in 
the Korean War, a failure to unify Taiwan, and economically heavy losses valued at 
“about 10 billion yuan (equal to U.S. $ 2.7 billion)” due to the war.106 Nevertheless, 
although the PRC received economic aid from the Soviet Union to restore its ruined 
economy, because China’s participation in the Korean War under the alliance with the 
Soviet Union separated China from most non-Communist countries politically and 
economically in the early 1950s, the PRC did not request to get money back from the 
DPRK for the cost of the war. Instead, it wrote off all Pyongyang’s war debts to Beijing 
and assisted North Korea by providing aid for restoring the DPRK economy.  
From the mid 1950s, an ideological dispute between Beijing and Moscow began 
growing due to a series of events: Beijing’s disappointments over Moscow’s insufficient 
aid to China; Moscow’s pursuit of “peaceful coexistence with the West”; the Soviet 
uncooperative attitude toward the Sino-Indian dispute in 1959; Moscow’s suspending 
atomic and economic assistance programs in 1959 and 1960; and Beijing’s denunciation 
of “the Soviet Union’s humiliating retreat” in the Cuban missile crisis in the early 
1960s.107 Just as relations between Beijing and Moscow began deteriorating from the mid 
1950s, so did Pyongyang’s relations with Moscow when the DPRK refused a Soviet 
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attempt to “shape the North Korean economy to serve Soviet economic priorities” in 
1956. Such a Soviet bid “led to North Korean efforts to attract Chinese aid as an offset to 
Soviet dependence,” and the Soviet military and economic aid to Pyongyang was 
suspended in 1962 (though it was resumed in 1965) when the DPRK denounced the 
Soviet Union as “revisionist” during the Cuban missile crisis as did the PRC.108 While 
the Pyongyang-Moscow and Beijing-Moscow relations were getting cool, Pyongyang 
was indirectly improving relations with Beijing. 
Meanwhile, when a military coup led by General Park Chung Hee took place on 
May 16, 1961, in South Korea, it caused Pyongyang to establish a security treaty with 
both Moscow and Beijing because of Kim Il Sung’s concerns about a likely attack on the 
North by the South. The Soviet Union signed a mutual defense treaty with the DPRK on 
July 6, 1961 and the PRC signed a mutual defense treaty with North Korea on July 11, 
1961, three years after the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV)’ complete withdrawal 
from North Korea in 1958. 
During the escalation of the tensions between Beijing and Moscow from the mid- 
1960s, the PRC tested its first atomic bomb in 1964 and its first hydrogen bomb in 1967 
in spite of the Soviet unilateral cessation of an atomic assistance program to China in 
1959.  As the Sino-Soviet dispute grew more and more heated from the mid-1960s to the 
mid-1980s, both the Soviet Union and the PRC gave the DPRK economic and military 
assistance to a great extent to make the DPRK favorable to each side because the Chinese 
leaders regarded the DPRK as a strategic ally or a counterbalance against the Soviet 
Union and vice versa. Kim Il Sung enjoyed extracting assistance from both of them. “By 
1976,” for example, “Soviet grants and loans to Pyongyang totaled $1.53 billion, against 
$967 million from China.”109 In fact, the PRC had held a rigid one-Korea policy (that is, 
while Beijing maintained the traditional friendship and alliance with Pyongyang, it did 
not recognize the legitimacy of Seoul government) until the mid 1980s. This one-Korea 
policy of the PRC derived not only from the Chinese blood ties with North Korea through 
the Korean War, but also from their competition for influence over Pyongyang in the 
Sino-Soviet conflict, which was the main reason why the PRC had given a high priority 
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for a couple of decades to the DPRK sharing a border with China. However, the Sino-
Soviet border clashes at Damansky (Zhenbao) Island in the Ussuri River and the 
Xinjiang/Kazakhstan border in March 1969 in which at least 800 Chinese and 30 Russian 
soldiers were killed led the PRC to shift its national policy from an ideological approach 
to pragmatism in the 1970s. Recognizing their defeat in the 1969 armed conflict with the 
Soviet Union, the Chinese realized the Russian military power’s superiority and needed a 
guarantor for its national security and economic development. At this point, “China hopes 
that U.S. power and influence will balance Soviet power and influence in the Pacific 
area.”110  
Under the circumstances, Zho Enlai’s four modernizations program in the early 
1970s, and Deng Xiaoping’s reform and open-door policy from the late 1970s onward 
reflected well the Chinese national policy shift. In consequence of it, President Nixon’s 
visit to China in February 1972 during which the Shanghai communiqué was issued 
played a great role in bringing détente into the Northeast Asia region. As a result, a joint 
communiqué between North and South Korea on July 4, 1972 proved to be only peace on 
paper as the then ROK Premier Kim Jong Pil mentioned when Pyongyang unilaterally 
annulled the Seoul-Pyongyang dialogue in 1973. However, the basic principles guiding 
unification through mutual cooperation and peaceful means still apply today. They also 
apply to the Sino-Japanese rapprochement at the Tanaka-Zhou summit in September 
1972, the Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship in August 1978, and the Sino-U.S. 
diplomatic normalization in January 1979 that ensued from Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 
1972. “As the PRC improved its relations with the U.S. and Japan,” therefore,  
Beijing’s hostility toward the ROK also decreased. Not only did the 
Chinese cease to see the ROK as an enemy, but also they began to 
recognize [Seoul as a good] trading partner and as a source of capital and 
high technology.111  
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Even though Beijing officially maintained a one-Korea policy all the time during 
the Cold War era, the PRC eventually began indirect trade with the ROK via Hong Kong 
since 1979.  
From Moscow’s point of view, the Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japan normalization raised 
the Soviet security concerns about a possible “two-front threat” from the United States 
and the PRC with atomic bombs. Coupled with these Soviet concerns, “there was thus a 
greater temptation in Moscow to cripple China before the seemingly inevitable 
confrontation with the United States or before Sino-American ties solidified into a full 
alliance.”112 It pushed Moscow to come closer to Pyongyang. After “Moscow decided in 
1984 to prepare for the worst-case scenario of a military conflict with Beijing by 
strengthening its ties with Pyongyang,” the first invitation for Kim Il Sung to visit 
Moscow in seventeen years and--thereafter--a huge Soviet military aid offer to 
Pyongyang took place. This aid included such “costly sophisticated equipment” as 
aircrafts (Mig-23, 29, and SU-25), missiles (Scud, SA-3, and AT-3), T-62 tanks and aid 
for building a helicopter factory that “pushed the grand total of Soviet cold war military 
aid to Pyongyang to $ 11.2 billion.”113 After Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, 
however, he “placed a high priority on improving relations with China and was willing to 
meet Beijing’s demands regarding the three obstacles.”114 In line with the renewal of the 
U.S.-Soviet détente during 1985-87, the PRC eventually reestablished normal relations 
with the Soviet Union in May 1989, about ten years after Beijing’s abrogation in 1980 of 
a thirty-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance signed in 1950.  
In the meantime, when the Tienanmen Democratic Movement took place in 1989, 
the Chinese leaders brutally quelled the people participating in the movement by using 
military troops and weapons of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This incident 
caused the West, especially the United States, to impose economic sanctions on Beijing. 
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“The primary goal of Chinese foreign policy after the Tienanmen massacre was to 
improve the international environment in China’s favor and bring back support for its 
economic reform.” To meet this goal, Beijing was “ready to establish or restore 
diplomatic relations with all nations, especially neighboring countries, regardless of 
historical hostility, differences in political systems and ideological bases.”115 During the 
late 1980s, while Moscow tried gradually to distance itself from Pyongyang and move 
closer to Seoul in order to gain economic aid from South Korea, Beijing strived to take a 
more equidistant posture toward Pyongyang and Seoul through trade and sports 
exchanges—including Beijing’s participation in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, as did 
Moscow. Under these circumstances, Moscow eventually set up diplomatic relations with 
Seoul in September 1990. In fact, Moscow’s normalization with Seoul in 1990 paved the 
way for Beijing’s normalization with Seoul in 1992 and became a good excuse to explain 
the PRC’s normalization policy to Pyongyang. In terms of North Korea’s economic 
situation, “Pyongyang’s inability to repay its international debts incurred during the early 
1970s caused a major embarrassment and left North Korea’s economy and trade in the 
doldrums.”116 After the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1990 and the Soviet Union at the 
end of 1991, the PRC thenceforth became a major benefactor for the DPRK because 
Pyongyang began to heavily rely on economic aid from Beijing more than before due to 
Russia’s withdrawal of economic assistance as well as its demand for hard currency in 
their trade with North Korea since 1991. Pyongyang, by that time, owed Moscow “a sum 
equivalent to US$2 billion, and more than US$500 million is due to China.”117 Beijing, 
however, has strived to “ease the economic burden of aid to Pyongyang, and the bilateral 
trade volume declined from $562 million in 1989 to $483 million in 1990.”118 As the  
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Cold War era came close to the end, under these circumstances, Pyongyang was regarded 
as a chronic economic burden to Beijing, whereas Seoul was seen by Beijing as a good 
trade partner. 
 
D. THE PRC-ROK BILATERAL RELATIONS  
Even though diplomatic normalization between the PRC and ROK was set up in 
1992, the PRC, even before then, began to unofficially maintain a two-Koreas policy  
(that is, the PRC de facto recognized both South Korea and North Korea as legitimate 
governments on the Korean peninsula), thanks to Deng Xiaoping’s reform policies and 
South Korea’s unbelievably rapid economic development.  
The first direct contact between the PRC and the ROK unexpectedly occurred in 
1983. “China’s policy of contacts with South Korea…began in May 1983 when the 
Chinese used the hijacking of a Chinese civilian aircraft to Seoul as an excuse for 
opening contacts.”119 Right after this incident took place, the PRC dispatched a 
negotiation team consisting of 33 persons to Seoul.  
As a result of their friendly but intense discussions, Shen [the head of the 
PRC’s delegates] and Gong [assistant minister of foreign affairs] signed a 
nine-article memorandum on May 10, 1983. Because this document listed 
Gong as representing “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Republic of 
Korea,” it implied China’s tacit de facto acknowledgment…of South 
Korea’s governmental authority.120 
Two years after this event, intergovernmental contacts between the two countries 
happened once again because, when a drifting PLA torpedo boat with two mutineers was 
towed to a nearby Korean harbor by a South Korean fishing boat, three PLA naval ships 
invaded the ROK’s territorial waters. At the time, the South Korean government swiftly 
and fairly dealt with it, in the process of solving this affair. Therefore, the Chinese began 
to have affirmative feelings toward South Korea. After these two important incidents, a 
number of contacts and visits took place among the businessmen and politicians between 
the two countries in China proper and the international arena. A huge number of Chinese 
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athletes, in particular, participated in both the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic 
Games in Seoul. As a result, these two international games that were successfully hosted 
by South Koreans gave a positive impression to the Chinese. 
Just before the commencement of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, ROK 
President Roh Tae Woo’s administration (1988-1992) launched its Nordpolitik, or 
Northern Policy. “Inspired by the West German ostpolitik, the policy called for the 
improvement of inter-Korean relations as well as South Korea’s relations with other 
socialist powers in conformity with the principles of equality, respect, and mutual 
prosperity.”121 As a result of this policy, the ROK could establish full diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union in 1990. In addition, “President Roh Tae Woo’s 
Nordpolitik…wooed Chinese leaders to recognize the potential for exponential growth in 
ROK-PRC economic ties.”122 Eventually, the PRC and the ROK agreed to exchange 
trade offices in 1990 and signed a trade agreement in 1991. Under the circumstances, 
Chinese Premier Li Peng successfully persuaded Kim Il Sung to enter the United Nations 
together with the ROK in order to make a good excuse for the coming normalization of 
China’s relations with South Korea as well as to isolate Taiwan from the international 
arena through normalization with the ROK (because, at the time, the ROK was one of 
few countries in Asia that recognized the ROC as a legitimate Chinese government). 
Thus North Korea finally joined the United Nations with South Korea as separate 
members in September 1991. In addition, two important accords between North and 
South Korea, the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and 
the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Co-operation, came 
in effect in February 1992. These events became a main driving force for the 
establishment of PRC-ROK full diplomatic relations that would be eventually realized on 
August 24, 1992. Nordpolitik, in fact, played a key role in establishing normalization 
with the PRC as well as the Soviet Union.  
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Although the PRC-ROK full diplomatic relations were established in 1992, on the 
other hand, Beijing and Seoul started economic relations in 1979. Since the late 1970s, 
Deng Xiaoping had embarked on an open-door policy as well as spurred “the four 
modernizations--that is, the modernization of agriculture, industry, science and 
technology, and national defense.”123 The main purpose of Deng Xiaoping’s reform 
policies was to achieve economic development or modernization, even though “among 
the goals of the Chinese revolution [reform policies] have been the achievement of 
territorial integrity, the development of national power, economic modernization, and the 
achievement of socialism.”124 In order to achieve these goals, the PRC had already begun 
to diplomatically and economically interact with non-communist countries in the early 
1970s. The motive for doing so was the 1969 border clash between the PRC and the 
Soviet Union. As a result of the military clash in 1969, the CCP’s high-rank leaders 
acknowledged that the modern technology, economy and military power of the Soviet 
Union were much more superior to those of the PRC, and regarded the Soviet Union as 
“China’s antagonistic contradiction”125 as well because they were concerned about the 
Soviet Union’s predominance of military strength being able to do harm to the Chinese 
national interest. At this point, the PRC needed partners that could afford to help assure 
Chinese security as well as economic development that could help the modernization of 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for the purpose of confronting the Soviet Union’s 
troops. Such a trend, as mentioned above, played an important role in commencing 
economic relations between the PRC and the ROK in the late 1970s. Although the 
economic interaction between the PRC and the ROK was an indirect form of trade via a 
third nation, in fact, it resulted from such Chinese reform policies as the four 
modernizations policy, open-door policy, and so forth. From the beginning of the Sino-
South Korean indirect trade, Hong Kong played an important role in the trade. Through 
such indirect trade via Hong Kong, the two countries began to trade in the volume of $19 
million in 1979 and two years later the volume increased to $280 million. Although the 
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1981 volume constituted 0.34 % of total Chinese foreign trade, it was more than half that 
of the Sino-North Korean trade.126 From the mid-1980s onward, the amount of Chinese 
trade with the ROK exceeded that of its trade with the DPRK at last. “In 1986, for 
example, bilateral commerce through Hong Kong increased seven percent to $646 
million...[this] figure exceeds by a substantial margin China’s bilateral trade with North 
Korea, which in 1986 totaled only $515 million.”127 
After the ROK successfully hosted the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic 
Games in Seoul, the South Korean government sincerely provided China with advice 
about tourist industries and financial and technological assistance for the Beijing Asian 
Games in 1990. Deng’s reform policies, the increasing trade volume, and South Korea’s 
cordially favorable attitude toward China preparing for the Beijing Asian Games, in fact, 
had a great influence over the two countries agreement to exchange trade offices in 1990. 
After that, the PRC and the ROK could start direct trade and signed a trade agreement in 
1991. From then on the PRC began to officially recognize South Korea’s government as 





                                                 
126 Chae Jin Lee (1996), p. 144. 
127 Norman D. Levin (1988), p. 3. 
52 
IV. THE TWO KOREAS AND THE PRC IN THE POST-COLD 
WAR ERA 
Throughout the Cold War period, South Korea was able to rehabilitate itself from 
the tragic trauma of the Korean War under the United States’ economic and security 
aegis, and, in return, Seoul remained one of the most cordial allies for the United States 
in Northeast Asia as well as all Asia regions. “As the Cold War evolved during the 
Reagan years, South Korea played a steadfast role as a regional security partner for the 
United States”--it, for instance, had demonstrated its cooperation in the Vietnam War. 
“South Korea reinforced that role through its efforts on the foreign policy front to 
diversify its economic and geopolitical interdependence.”128 As a result of Nordpolitik, 
the most valuable of Seoul’s foreign policy efforts in the late 1980s, Seoul could establish 
full diplomatic relations with many communist states in Eastern Europe and, above all, 
with Pyongyang’s two most important allies, the Soviet Union in 1990 and the PRC in 
1992. After that, while Pyongyang has felt itself more isolated from the world and sought 
to develop nuclear weapon systems to deal with Washington, Seoul has actively 
participated in multilateral organizations for maintaining peace and stability on the 
Korean peninsula.  
On the other hand, due to the Sino-U.S. normalization in 1979, the 
reestablishment of Sino-Soviet normalization in 1989, and particularly the end of the 
Cold War era after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, China has had no direct 
threats from a superpower since the early 1990s. Under these favorable circumstances, 
“China’s national goals are peace, security, and stability (particularly in the Asia-Pacific 
region), comprehensive development, and reunification of Taiwan with the mainland.”129 
In the post-Cold War era, “the main purpose of its new approach in foreign affairs is to 
provide a long-term peaceful and secure environment for China’s modernization and a 
favorable condition for its reform and opening-up policy.”130 As a result, the CCP leaders 
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have paid the largest attention to China’s economic development among the Chinese 
national goals to attain its four modernizations. The main reason is because “Chinese 
leaders have concluded from the demise of the Soviet Union and Soviet communism that 
survival of the Chinese communist regime depends on rapid economic development.”131 
To achieve Beijing’s major national interests, especially economic development but 
excluding the reunification issue and territorial disputes resolution, the PRC began to join 
and cooperate with multilateral organizations, but it has been clearly much more 
enthusiastic about bilateral rather than multilateral channels in the post-Cold War period. 
In this section, first, bilateral trends between Beijing-Pyongyang, Washington-
Seoul, and Beijing-Seoul will be examined, and then both Beijing and Seoul’s approaches 
to multilateralism will be evaluated. Then, Beijing and Seoul’s attitudes toward 
multilateralism for their respective unification will be briefly assessed at the end of this 
section. 
 
A. BILATERAL TRENDS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
 
1. The ROK’s Bilateral Relations with the United States 
Seoul-Beijing bilateral relations have rapidly developed and have become 
increasingly interdependent since the post-Cold War era began and particularly after the 
1992 PRC-ROK normalization. Nevertheless, as long as North Korea’s tangible threat 
has persisted, South Korea has always been very dependent on bilateral relations with the 
United States in light of security and economy concerns, and has placed such relations 
between Seoul and Washington as the top priority since 1950. As South Korea’s security 
and economic capabilities continue to grow, however, South Koreans “demand, based on 
the nation’s increased strength, for a change in the U.S.-South Korea relationship from 
patron-client to [real] partners.”132 Moreover, the recent differences of policy toward 
North Korea between the two governments and anti-Americanism or nationalism by 
South Koreans might have a deep impact on their future relations. 
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In terms of Seoul-Washington security relations, the United States has had, since 
the Korean War, an overwhelmingly huge influence over the security affairs of the 
Korean Peninsula. The main reason is not only because Washington is Seoul’s sole 
military ally, but also because it “maintains approximately 37,000 troops in South 
Korea…[which consists of] the Second Infantry Division and Seventh Air Force, with 
three squadrons of F-16 fighters, one squadron of A-10, and OA-10 ground attack 
aircraft.”133 However, anti-Americanism has risen in South Korea due to such sensitive 
issues as the U.S. pressure to further open the Korean market since the late 1980s, the 
Agreed Framework process which was reached in Geneva on October 1994, the U.S. 
hawkish way of dealing with the ROK during the financial crisis of 1997-1998 (although 
Washington played a leading role in relieving Seoul from the crisis through the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)), the two Koreas’ summit in 2000, and the Status of 
Forces Agreement (SOFA) revision134 that was subjected to closer scrutiny after two 
middle schoolgirls’ death by a U.S. armored tank in 2002. As a result of a series of such 
events, South Koreans recently called for the U.S. troops’ withdrawal at last. As a 
response, a senior official at the U.S. Department of Defense said “the U.S. position [is] 
that it would withdraw its forces from Korea ‘tomorrow’ if that were what South Koreans 
wanted.”135 As US 8th Army Commander General Charles Campbell said, “state policies 
were not made on the basis of emotion but of national interest.”136 It is time for both 
Seoul and Washington to rethink such an important issue in light of national interests for 
the two states. 
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In the mid-1990s, in the light of ROK-U.S. economic relations, South Korea 
became the United States’ eighth largest trading partner after Canada, Mexico, Japan, the 
U.K., Germany, Taiwan, and China--now, the seventh largest trading partner. The 
Washington-Seoul bilateral trade grew from $37.7 billion in 1994 to $67 billion in 2000 
(the amount was important to South Korea when considering the indicator because the 
U.S.-Asian merchandise trade marked $345 billion, whereas that between the United 
States and Europe reached $227 billion in 1992).137 As a result, South Korea remains the 
sixth largest importer of U.S. products and the United States is, for Seoul, the largest 
trading partner.138 In fact, South Korea was able to become the 11th largest economy state 
in the early 2000s, after growing from one of the world’s poorest agricultural countries in 
the 1950s under the military and economic auspices of the United States. However, after 
the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) began to expand free trade in 1989, 
U.S.-ROK conflicts over the openness of South Korea’s agricultural market, as well as 
the U.S. efforts--economic pressure--to reduce trade deficits complicated the relationship. 
In addition, after overcoming the economic crisis of 1997-1998, South Koreans still have 
“dissatisfaction with perceived U.S. willingness to use crude, bare-knuckle leverage in its 
own economic self-interest at the expense of the economic interest of others.”139 
“However, the real potential for policy disaccord between Seoul and Washington 
is…in the unduly tough and hard-line American policy towards North Korea.”140 In 
terms of policy toward Pyongyang, the U.S. policy of “inducing change in North Korea 
via subtle economic and diplomatic incentives is… rooted in Reagan-Shultz era ‘smile 
diplomacy’ [1983-1988] that …had produced an effort by Washington to encourage an 
inter-Korean dialogue.” And then, “the George H. W. Bush administration…produced the 
first U.S.-DPRK talks, held in Beijing”. In addition, the Clinton administration followed 
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the former Presidents’ “sound policy line” toward North Korea141 in line with President 
Kim Dae Jung’s “sunshine policy”—engagement policy toward North Korea—unlike the 
previous President Kim Young Sam. “Despite North Korea’s initial post-September 11 
efforts to disassociate…[Pyongyang] from the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon,”142 however, President George W. Bush in his State of the Union 
address in late January 2002 grouped Iran, Iraq and North Korea together as an “axis of 
evil.”143 This had a bad impact on the mood of Seoul-Pyongyang reconciliation on the 
Korean peninsula. In October 2002, Pyongyang admitted to having “a secret nuclear 
weapons programme” at last.144 Some South Koreans were convinced that the present 
stalemate of inter-Korean reconciliation is “due primarily to President George W. Bush’s 
hard-line stance toward North Korea.”145  
Although PRC-ROK relations have grown remarkably and consequently have 
been so important since 1992, South Koreans should not downgrade the importance of 
the U.S.-ROK bilateral relationship. “On the basis of a durable alliance built on 
allegiances to democracy and the market economy, Korea and the U.S. should strive to 
develop a mature partnership in addition to effective policy coordination on North 
Korea.”146 
 
2. The PRC’S Bilateral Relations with the DPRK   
The repercussions of the Chinese democratic movement that occurred at 
Tienanmen Square in 1989 gave North Korea’s leaders a negative impression of reforms 
in line with the West, especially the United States. In fact, the Tienanmen incident 
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“exacerbated the North’s hardline stance” toward openness to the world and “confirmed 
the Kims’ conviction that dabbling with reform, moderation…would court disaster” as 
would be proven in the case of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.147 In addition, 
Seoul’s successful normalizations with Pyongyang’s two largest patrons, Moscow and 
Beijing, caused Kims’ regime to feel itself more isolated from the world. Due to the 
aftermath of these events, “Pyongyang realized its nuclear weapons program provided a 
strong card to play against the U.S. to achieve diplomatically its political, economic, and 
security objectives for the post-Cold War environment.”148 Pyongyang’s nuclear policy 
coupled with its missiles program held Beijing partially at bay. The PRC, for instance, 
was embarrassed in the case of the nuclear crisis in 1993-1994, the Taepodong missile 
launch over Japan in 1998 and Pyongyang’s admission about restarting its nuclear 
program in 2002. As for Pyongyang, notwithstanding these tensions, Beijing is its most 
important benefactor in the security and economic fields in the post-Cold War period. 
In terms of the PRC-DPRK security relationship, Beijing apparently has stopped 
supplying new arms to Pyongyang since the late 1980s. Additionally, after the deaths of 
Kim Il Sung on July 8, 1994 and Deng Xiaoping on February 19, 1997, the Beijing-
Pyongyang security relations that were based on ideological solidarity as well as blood 
ties cemented during the Korean War at the expense of numerous Chinese People’s 
Volunteers (CPV) considerably waned. Nevertheless, the PRC-DPRK relations--
including military-to-military ties--have remained “cordial in the 1990s.” The main 
reason is because Beijing--unlike Moscow that revised the 1961 mutual security treaty 
and signed the new Russia-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and 
Cooperation with Pyongyang on February 9, 2000 by erasing Article 1, which stipulates 
its automatic military intervention in case of a Second Korean War--has not revised the 
1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance signed in 1961 with 
Pyongyang.149  
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On the economic front, PRC-DPRK trade relations steadily increased during the 
period from the 1950s until the 1970s—“North Korea’s per capita income was higher 
than South Korea’s as recently as the early 1970s”150--but it began to decrease in the 
1980s especially after the onset of Deng Xiaoping’s open door policy. In the 1990s its 
relations became so much worse that the total bilateral trade volume between Beijing and 
Pyongyang had gradually declined from “the peak level of nearly $900 million in 
1993…[to] a mere $370 million in 1999, according to PRC statistics.”151 For reference, 
the size of Beijing-Seoul trade volume had increased from about $9 billion in 1993 to $25 
billion in 1999. Nevertheless, China is today North Korea’s biggest trading partner. 
Moreover, Pyongyang has suffered a severe economic crisis in the post-Cold War 
era because economic assistance--notably subsidizes from Beijing and particularly 
Moscow--were considerably reduced. Moscow reduced its petroleum trade with 
Pyongyang “from half a million tons in 1989 to 40,000 tons in 1991” and Beijing 
“maintained an average one hundred million tons per year in the period 1989 to 1996, but 
cut it by half thereafter.” Also North Korean food shortages became worse on account of 
the severe floods during the mid-1990s. “U.S. Census Bureau estimates suggested that 
about 1 million North Koreans died as a result of famine between 1994 and 1998”152 and 
Beijing’s food aid to Pyongyang “is estimated by aid agencies and foreign governments  
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at 1 million tonnes of wheat and rice” per year.153 Under this situation, “North Korea 
remains dependent on China’s supply of petroleum and food, an increasingly important 
factor given the former’s energy and food shortage.”154 
Kim Jong Il’s visits to China in May 2000, that was his first visit since 1983, and 
in January 2001 are regarded as Pyongyang’s attempts to enhance relations with Beijing 
for the purposes of overcoming its economic hardship as well as diplomatic isolation 
from the outside world. Mainly due to its security interest, Beijing has remained--and will 
likely continue--as the most active and substantial patron of Pyongyang since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, one of the largest benefactors for North Korea along with the PRC. 
 
3. The PRC-ROK Bilateral Relations 
Steadily increasing economic interactions in trade and investment between 
Beijing and Seoul since the late 1970s, in fact, played an important role in establishing 
the normalization between Beijing and Seoul in 1992. In the context of it, “the 1992 
Sino-South Korean normalization and the two countries’ fast-growing economic ties 
testify to the vicissitude of Cold War politics and the validity of China’s ongoing reform 
and open-door policy.”155 Under the circumstances, the relations between the PRC and 
the ROK have evolved toward being more interdependent and constructive in the fields 
of security and economy. 
In the post-Cold War era, Chinese policy toward Korea has been shifted to a 
policy pursuing stability on the Korean peninsula in order to further expand its national 
interests (i.e., to achieve economic development and the four modernizations, and to gain 
stature in the international community). For such interests, the PRC played a positive role 
in reducing the Seoul-Pyongyang tensions on the peninsula. Beijing, for instance, strived 
to support the 1992 Seoul-Pyongyang accords on denuclearization as well as to alleviate 
the 1993-1994 nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. In addition, “China not only 
provided the venue for preliminary contacts between North and South Korea, but also  
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encouraged the summit event” for a successful two Koreas’ summit talk in Pyongyang in 
June 2000.156 It becomes clear that prosperity and stability on the Korean peninsula can 
not be expected any more without constructive and peaceful help from the PRC. 
In terms of PRC-ROK trade, the trade volume between them has steadily been 
growing since the establishment of the PRC-ROK full diplomatic relations. It is as 
follows: 
Sino-ROK trade ballooned to $6.4 billion in 1992, $9 billion in 1993, 
$11.6 billion in 1994, $16.5 billion in 1995, $20 billion in 1996, and $23.7 
billion in 1997. By 1997 it was almost three times larger than the Sino-
Russian trade volume ($7 billion), seven times the Russo-ROK trade 
volume ($3 billion), and thirty-four times the Sino-North Korean trade 
volume ($699 million).157 
Trade volume shrank during the period of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998), 
but it bounced back after the rapid economic recovery of South Korea from the financial 
crisis in 1998, in part, due to the Chinese favorable attitude (not to devalue their own 
currency, Yuan). The size of the bilateral trade volume in 2001, reached $31.49 billion, 
an amount that was approximately 5 times as much in 1992.158 “In 2001,” the PRC 
“became Korea’s second largest trading partner…Korea has also become an important 
trading partner for China, following Japan, the U.S., and Hong Kong in recent years.”159 
The PRC’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in late 2001, in particular, 
would have a great impact on the ROK-PRC bilateral economic relations, which would 
boost the ROK-PRC trade and investment volume, enhance much more mutual economic 
interdependence between them, and ultimately help to keep peace, stability and 
prosperity on the Korean peninsula intact. 
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B. THE PRC’S APPROACH TO MULTILATERALISM 
During the Cold War era, “China viewed multilateral organizations as instruments 
of Western imperialism and refused to have any part of them.”160 However, 
contemplating the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1991, Beijing perceived the United States “as in an unprecedented strong position from 
which to impose a new world order based on American values, including human rights, 
democracy, and capitalism.”161 Against such a backdrop, Beijing leaders’ views on this 
in the post-Cold War period began to shift from being an instrument serving U.S. 
interests to “a mechanism to counter the U.S.’s bilateral military alliances around the 
Asia-Pacific and thus constrain [what the Chinese perceive as] American hegemony.”162  
The PRC became a member state of the United Nations (UN) in 1971 and then 
was selected as one of the five permanent UN Security Council members with the veto 
power in voting procedures--unlike non-permanent members. The Security Council’s 
core responsibility is to maintain the world’s peace as well as security. In the context of 
the Security Council’s main responsibility and the PRC’s retaining a veto power, the 
PRC’s position in the Security Council is important especially with regard to issues such 
as keeping peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. For instance, during the nuclear 
crisis of 1993-1994, during armed troops’ entry into the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) after 
a breach of the truce in 1996, and when an admission by Pyongyang about a “secret” 
nuclear program in 2002 occurred, China rejected hawkish resolutions recommended by 
the Security Council and strived to resolve those hot issues through peaceful 
dialogues.163 In light of more interdependent relations between the Beijing and Seoul, 
Beijing is expected to play a great role in dealing with Korean issues in favor of peaceful 
resolution measures that Seoul, since Kim Dae Jung’s administration started, has sought 
when conflicts take place between Pyongyang and Seoul or Washington. 
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In 1991, China became a participant in the Asia Pacific Economic Conference 
(APEC), which was formed in 1989 for the purpose of economic interests “promoting 
greater economic liberalization…and also strengthening the position of the Asia-Pacific 
region in the context of the Uruguay Round.” In the meanwhile, “APEC did assume some 
significance for security regionalism” after it became “annual summit meetings of heads 
of government in 1993” as a fruit of the Clinton administration’s efforts.164 Since then, 
China has participated in multilateral organizations in the region. At the APEC meeting 
in 2000, Chinese President Jiang Zemin emphasized “‘closer economic and technological 
ties between nations and regions’ constitute ‘a positive factor to promote world peace and 
stability.’”165 However, 
The Chinese government does not want APEC to develop into a 
multilateral security institution in the Asia Pacific region because Taiwan 
is a non-state member of APEC. Since China regards Taiwan as part of 
China, Beijing does not want to see other countries or multilateral 
institutions discuss security issues with Taiwan.166  
The ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) invited the PRC “to 
attend the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) as a guest, beginning in 1991.” It also 
invited China “at the Singapore AMM in July 1993 to [make Beijing] join the newly 
proposed ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to be held in Bangkok in 1994.”167 So, the 
PRC became a member state of ARF formed in 1994 that aims to strengthen the 
multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in the region. By 1997, “China had become 
an active participant both in the ARF and the so-called ‘track two,’ or unofficial dialogue 
process that complements the official deliberations.”168 Since then, China has strived to 
cooperate with the ASEAN countries in the fields of politics, security, trade, and so forth. 
However, Beijing is sensitive to the issue of the South China Sea and especially the 
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Taiwan issue. It does not want the two issues to be mediated in the ARF.169 Moreover, 
“China has made it very clear that it is against ARF becoming a mechanism for conflict 
resolution in the region”170 Besides, China has participated in ASEAN Plus Three (APT) 
summit meetings since 1997, when the first APT summit meeting was held—the ‘Three’ 
refers to the ROK, the PRC, and Japan. APT “emerged as an East Asian version of 
implicit security regionalism, taking its place alongside…[such] security regionalism [as 
APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum].”171  
In line with the joint proposal to the Four Party Talks by President Bill Clinton 
and President Kim Young Sam in 1996, China has been one of the four members--China, 
the U.S. and the two Koreas. Since the Four-Party Talks were launched in 1997 to 
negotiate a peace treaty on the Korean peninsula using multilateral security cooperation 
among them, Beijing chaired the second official session in March 1998 and has been 
actively “cooperative with the parties concerned for the purpose of ensuring the peace, 
stability and peaceful reunification” on the peninsula.172  
The PRC also is one of the member states in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), dubbed as the ‘Shanghai Six,’ which was launched in June 2001 as 
the result of a summit meeting among the presidents of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to enhance peace, stability, and prosperity 
among the countries.173 This multilateral organization also aims “to strengthen mutual 
trust and friendly relations among member states, and encourages cooperation in a variety 
of fields ranging from culture and environmental protection to science and education.”174 
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The PRC won in September 2001 final negotiations for its admission to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO)--the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT)’s 
successor--which was established in 1995. Because China’s international trade volume 
was evaluated as the world’s seventh rank in 2000, China’s entry to the WTO will “have 
a major impact on world trade and investment, as well as its own economic 
development.”175 As a result of Beijing’s admission to the WTO, “China will start 
formally…to integrate itself into the world capitalist economic and political system, the 
basic characteristics of which are market economics and democratic politics.”176 
 
C. THE ROK’S APPROACH TO MULTILATERALISM 
After the truce halting the Korean War in 1953, South Korea signed the Mutual 
Defense Treaty with the United States on October 1, 1953, which entered into force on 
November 17, 1954. During the Cold War era, since then, South Korea had become 
exclusively dependent in particular on the U.S. security and economic bilateral relations 
vis-à-vis North Korea’s tangible threats. However, after the Sino-U.S. rapprochement in 
1972 and the oil crisis in the 1970s, “South Korea…moved by the 1970s and 1980s into a 
more independent global economic network that foreshadowed broader multilateralism 
…[but] it was clear that Seoul wanted to cultivate its bilateral ties with the United States 
as long as it feasibly could.”177 In 1988, in the meantime, President Roh’s Nordpolitik 
became a main driving force of Seoul’s enthusiasm for diverting from its heavy 
dependency on the U.S.-ROK bilateral relations toward multilateralism in the post-Cold 
War era. From mid-1994, President Kim Young Sam’s administration (1993-1997) 
focused on five fundamentals as “Korea’s New Diplomacy” for its foreign policy, 
namely, “globalism, diversification, multi-dimensionalism, regional cooperation, and 
future orientation.”178 After that, President Kim’s administration “accelerated the 
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emphasis on globalism as the cornerstone of its foreign policy…it represents Seoul’s 
long-standing desire to diversify its interdependence, cultivating markets and friendly 
relations globally.”179 After the end of Kim Young Sam’s presidency, President Kim Dae 
Jung’s administration (1998-2002) launched the “new Constructive Engagement or 
Sunshine Policy,” which “calls for a gradual opening up of the North [Korea] and 
confidence-building measures today that will hopefully pave the way for eventual 
reunification” through various multilateral organizations via favorable bilateral 
relations.180  
The forty-three years after the ROK was established in August 1948 through a 
general election under the supervision of the United Nations (UN) in May of the same 
year, it at last became a full member state of the UN simultaneously with the DPRK on 
September 17, 1991. In the process of Seoul’s joining the UN, the PRC played an 
important role in persuading Pyongyang to accept its simultaneous entry with Seoul. 
South Korea, since then, has actively participated in UN activities. For instance, it has 
actively taken part in UN Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO) mainly by dispatching a 
military engineering unit, a medical service unit, etc. to such areas as Somalia, Angola, 
Jammu and Kashmir, East Timor and so forth.181 In addition, South Korea was qualified 
as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council from 1996 until 1997. During 
the period, it had also vigorously participated in activities in the Security Council. Such 
activities helped enhance South Korea’s political position in the international arena as 
well as to have other member countries understand its endeavors in the United Nations. 
In 1991, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) agreed to support 
the Tumen River Area Development Programme suggested by states within this region 
“to establish an institutional mechanism for regional dialogue and further cooperation.” 
Since its establishment, it has promoted “economic, environmental and technical 
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cooperation” among the five member states--the two Koreas, China, Russia, and 
Mongolia. The member countries have actively participated in annual Vice Ministerial 
level-meetings in the Consultative Commission for the Development of the Tumen River 
Economic Development Area and Northeast Asia. It is strongly expected that the Tumen 
River Area Development Programme would “bring the member countries together on a 
sub-regional basis…to help Northeast Asia achieve peace and prosperity.”182 
South Korea strives to facilitate Asia-Pacific regional cooperation by supporting 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) 
meetings—the ‘Three’ means South Korea, China, and Japan. When South Korea hosted 
the annual meeting of APEC in 1991, it helped mediate China’s participation in APEC, 
along with Taiwan and Hong Kong.183 In fact, “APEC has evolved from a consultative 
forum into a central intergovernmental organization for policy coordination and 
cooperation.”184 In addition, South Korea tries to assume an initiative role “in developing 
the ASEAN Plus Three into an East Asia summit and put forth the vision of an East Asia 
free-trade area.”185 For instance, President Kim Dae-jung proposed an East Asian Vision 
Group (EAVG) for the purpose of increasing East Asian regional cooperation as well as 
convening a formal East Asian summit at the APT summit in Hanoi in December 1998. 
Besides, he proposed “a free-trade area that would include all APT members” at the 2001 
meeting in Brunei.186 
The ARF was initiated in July 1994 by ASEAN, which was established in 1967. 
At the non-governmental level, in addition, South Korea has proposed a North 
East Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) and tried to promote NEASED track-II, in which 
“South Korea takes a gradual approach in pursuing multilateral security cooperation” in 
the region, and it also “places emphasis on building mutual confidence, which will help 
nurture the habits of regional consultation and establish the patterns of regional 
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cooperation.”187 When North Korea at last entered into ARF in July 2000, the South 
Korean government welcomed the DPRK’s admission to ARF as well as noting it 
“greatly value[s] the ARF for its positive role as the only multilateral security 
arrangement in the Pacific region.”188 South Korea has also “urged Asian nations to 
support the rehabilitation of the inter-Korean peace process” in ARF, since North Korea’s 
entry into ARF.189  
The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) funded 
through financial support from South Korea, the United States, the European Union, 
Japan and other 9 countries was created in 1995 to implement the 1994 Agreed 
Framework signed between Washington and Pyongyang, under which Pyongyang agreed 
to freeze and ultimately renounce its suspected nuclear program in progress. In return, 
KEDO was to provide North Korea with heavy fuel oil and a modern nuclear power 
plant. Through its activities, KEDO contributed to a stronger international nuclear non-
proliferation regime, while improving the prospects for lasting peace and stability on the 
Korean Peninsula and beyond. From the beginning of KEDO, South Korea took a leading 
role as a member of KEDO’s Executive Board and “has had a direct role in KEDO’s 
decision-making process.”190 
The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) that is held every two years was first held in 
Bangkok in March 1996 to check the U.S. dominance within APEC that limited the 
European Union (EU)’s role in Asia. ASEM’s primary objectives are “to improve mutual 
understanding and to accelerate …economic and political cooperation” between Asia and 
Europe.191 When considering a divided Korea’s future, ASEM is full of meaning to 
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South Korea because “it completes the tripolar relations between America, Europe, and 
Asia.” South Korea hosted the third ASEM summit meeting in Seoul in 2000 and is 
trying to “enhance its status as a facilitator country within the region.”192  
South Korea became a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) in December 1996 and a year later it withdrew from the 
Group of 77, a negotiating organization that consists of the developing countries. Seoul’s 
entry to OECD “provides an additional forum for promoting commercial co-operation 
with EU member states. Furthermore, Korea’s growing status and responsibilities in East 
Asia enable it to play a potentially crucial role in assisting the EU lever in influence over 
the future path of Pacific affairs” and vice versa.193 
In 1996, then Presidents Kim Young Sam and Bill Clinton jointly proposed the 
Four-Power (or Party) Talks among the two Koreas, the PRC, and the United States for a 
peace process on the Korean peninsula in April 1996 during a summit meeting in Korea. 
Since 1997, the Four-Party Talks aimed at fulfilling the task to replace the existing truce 
with a formal peace treaty have been in progress. South Korea makes every endeavor to 
maintain stability on the peninsula and to attain a peace treaty--and then eventual 
unification. 
 
D. THE PRC AND THE ROK’S ATTITUDES TOWARD 
MULTILATERALISM FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE UNIFICATION 
China was able to rehabilitate its reputation from about 100 years of humiliation 
by the West--from the Opium War (1839-1842) until the 1949 establishment of the PRC  
--when the Chinese Peoples’ Volunteers repelled the U.S.-led U.N. forces from the 
territory of North Korea in the Korean War. During the Cold War era, although the PRC 
became one of the UN member states in 1971, it had regarded multilateral organizations 
as instruments of Western imperialism. In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War and the 
Soviet collapse in 1991, however, Beijing began having concerns about “U.S. and/or 
Japanese domination in such a [multilateral] bloc or organization” It also worried that “a 
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collective security structure may hamper China’s own ambitions in the region, including 
its handling of the Taiwan issue.”194 Against such a backdrop, the PRC’s approach 
toward security multilateralism came from “the possibility of weakening U.S. bilateral 
ties with nations in the region, thereby enhancing its own regional influence” while 
keeping good relations with those states.195 After 1993, under these circumstances, the 
PRC began taking “a positive stance toward multilateral security dialogues and 
institutions [such as ARF, the Four-Power Talks, SCO and so forth] in the Asia Pacific 
region”196 because Beijing associates peace and stability in the region, especially on the 
Korean peninsula with its continued economic growth and advancement under the 
peaceful conditions created after the advent of the post-Cold War era. Nevertheless, while 
the PRC has tried to actively participate in economic and security multilateral 
institutions, it does not want such multilateral organizations to deal with agendas 
regarded as domestic issues by Beijing such as territorial disputes and especially the 
Taiwan issue. Beijing traditionally tends to prefer handling such important issues through 
bilateral negotiations rather than to try to settle them through multilateral means. 
During the Cold War era, on the other hand, because South Korea was able to 
recover from ruins in the Korean War and then achieve remarkable economic and 
security growth under the aegis of the U.S.-ROK alliance, it had all the time been under 
the shadow of the ROK’s unilateral dependency on the United States. As its international 
status was enhanced due to economic achievements from the mid-1960s onward, 
however, Seoul has strived to shift its relations with Washington from a “client-state 
status” to an “authentic partnership.” Accordingly, South Koreans “appear genuinely 
enthusiastic about multilateralism in security and economic matters as a vehicle for the 
Korean people to achieve parity with their neighbors and external major powers 
interested in Korea, notably the United States.”197 Most importantly, Seoul has strived to 
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actively participate in--and, at times, take a leading position in--various multilateral 
organizations such as the UN, APT, ARF, APEC, OECD, ASEM, KEDO, the Four-
Power Talks and so on in order to maintain reconciliation, stability and prosperity on the 
Korean peninsula, and to ultimately obtain Korean unification through peaceful 
processes. South Korea’s people are convinced “that the foremost Korean contribution to 
regional and global security should come through the alleviation of tension on the Korean 
peninsula.” To make Pyongyang open to the world, maintain peace and stability on the 
peninsula, and attain ultimate Korean reunification, “the South Korean government has 
sought to promote North Korea’s engagement in multilateral regional activities.”198 
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V. THE PRC’S VIEWS ON KOREAN UNIFICATION 
It is the conventional wisdom on Beijing’s views on Korean unification that the 
PRC prefers the status quo on the Korean peninsula. In addition, China would continue to 
offer its support for the DPRK regime’s survival because the PRC would like to gain both 
economic benefit by improving its relations with the ROK and the United States and 
political leverage in the Korean affairs by maintaining its good relations with the two 
Koreas.199 Thus, it is widely expected that “China has no interest in Korean unification, 
which would draw Seoul into a common border with China’s massive population and 
formidable ground forces.”200 However, since the end of Mao Zedong’s era and the 
ensuing onset of Deng Xiaoping’s era, the primary driving force in China’s foreign policy 
priorities have been affected much more by its national interests than by any other factor. 
Besides, when considering the United States’ economy and perceived military hegemony 
in world affairs, especially on the Korean peninsula, a deteriorating economic situation in 
North Korea and the enhanced position of South Korea in international affairs, such a 
context implies China’s views on Korean unification are changing.   
In terms of the PRC’s views on Korean unification, several negative and 
affirmative expectations coexist. Within Beijing’s views on the issue, the most likely 
estimated negative expectations are as follows:201 
• a unified Korea would remove the DPRK as China’s critical buffer zone, 
• Korean unification would diminish Beijing’s leverage in Korean and 
world affairs, including its relations with the United States on these issues, 
• Korean reunification could spew more refugees from the North into 
China’s northeastern provinces [in the case of a sudden collapse of the 
North Korean regime], and  
• a unified Korea could bring about possible territorial conflicts on China’s 
border.  
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“From Beijing’s perspective,” on the other hand, “an eventual Korean 
reunification will have four major consequences for China.” Such likely affirmative 
expectations are as follows:202  
• the emergence of a unified Korean peninsula will change the power 
structure in East Asia permanently, 
• a unified Korea will become vital for China’s strategy to contain America 
in East Asia, 
• a unified Korea will play a key role and become one of the most important 
partners in China’s economic development, and 
• Korean unification will facilitate the eventual reunification between 
mainland China and Taiwan. 
Against this background, in this section, the PRC’s views on Korean unification 
will be examined and analyzed in the light of ideology, economy, great powers dynamics, 




The ideological blood ties between Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung’s generation 
were created and cemented during the Korean War period at the expense of the Chinese 
People’s Volunteers (CPV) and the Korean People’s Army (KPA) against the U.S.-led 
allies and were further developed during the Sino-Soviet disputes. However, ideological 
“lips and teeth” relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Worker’s 
Party of Korea (WPK) have increasingly waned over time, especially since China’s 
policy shift from Marxist ideology to market pragmatism by Deng Xiaoping in the late 
1970s.  
When Deng Xiaoping came to the power in the CCP in 1978 after Mao Zedong’s 
death in 1976, he “initially pursued his efforts along two major lines” for the purpose of 
making the country prosperous and strong: “loosening the ideological straitjacket” by 
eschewing Maoist egalitarianism and collectivism, and “creating a general sense of new 
opportunities to generate excitement and support” by improving the standard of living of 
                                                 
202 Xiaoxiong Yi. “Ten Years of China-South Korea Relations and Beijing’s view on Korean 
Reunification.” The Journal of East Asian Affairs. Vol. XVI, No. 2, Fall/Winter 2002, p. 338. The author 
quoted the citation from Chen Fengjun and Wang Chuanjian. Asian-Pacific Major Powers and Korean 
Peninsula, pp. 1-14. 
74 
the populace.203 Deng created and exercised reforms and an open door policy. Since his 
reform policy was based on China’s access to capitalist economies, Deng “virtually 
renounced Marxism-Leninism as China’s economic model, instead giving greater play to 
market forces…and encouraging foreign trade with and investment in China.”204 In 
addition, Deng especially emphasized a foreign policy that could enhance China’s 
national interest, in particular its economic development by means of achieving the four 
modernizations. Deng’s reforms had “contributed to the loss of ideology” and had 
“encouraged people to exercise initiative and make money, all of which made them less 
receptive to communist ideology.”205 Because of Deng’s reforms and open door policies 
the “ideas of Western democracy have been implemented and Chinese Communism has 
been diluted.” Moreover, “The ideas of liberal democracy have consequently spread 
rapidly.”206 
Also Beijing viewed the DPRK as “a buffer state” against democratic capitalism-
oriented states, especially, the United States and Japan, as well as an ideologically 
important ally. Such a notion had a great impact on Beijing’s views on Korean 
unification. However, although China regards both the U.S.-ROK and the U.S.-Japan 
alliance as threats to itself, Beijing’s concept of North Korea as a buffer zone against 
those two alliances has gradually been declining--particularly since normalization with 
both Japan and the United States in the 1970s. Instead, Beijing increasingly has regarded 
Pyongyang as “an economic burden” since the PRC became a main benefactor of the 
North Korean regime after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991.207  
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In such a milieu, even though “ideology played a significant role in determining 
Chinese foreign policy [toward Pyongyang] during the Mao era,”208 the primary driving 
force of Chinese foreign policy has been based on China’s national interests rather than 
on ideology--particularly since Deng Xiaoping strongly pushed a reform and open door 
policy.  
Therefore, “ideological concerns and the legacy of the Korean War are allegedly 
secondary and fading factors in Chinese policy toward North Korea.” For instance, Jiang 
Zemin said at the 4th Plenary Session of the 14th CCP Central Committee (CCPCC) in 
1994, “Our foreign policy must proceed from our country’s basic interests, and should 
ignore ideology.”209 In addition, “Most [Chinese] analysts insist that the emphasis is 
increasingly on state-to-state ties and that economics, national interest, and realpolitik are 
rapidly emerging as dominant factors determining China’s relationship with North 
Korea.”210 Under these circumstances, moreover, most Chinese experts “insist that 
Beijing would not be concerned about the demise of a communist ally on its border 




The CCP’s cadres acknowledge the fact that “when the Soviet Union collapsed in 
1991, it did so not by invasion, through military force, but implosion, through internal 
stress rooted in economic failure and elite disillusionment.”212 As an aftermath of the 
demise of the Soviet Union, “domestic political stability” has become “the top security 
priority” in Beijing, and “a stable and relaxed international security environment is 
indispensable to that goal.” The CCP’s leaders believe the former “rests on rapid 
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economic development”213 in order to avoid the same fate of the Soviet Union as well as 
a second Tienanmen incident. It is asserted by some analysts “the PRC’s overwhelming 
concern [in Chinese foreign policy] is in promoting a peaceful environment for Chinese 
economic development.”214 Thus, China’s continuous economic growth is most 
important to the future of both the CCP and the PRC. In addition, the main driving force 
of Chinese foreign policy is based on China’s key national interest--i.e., its economic 
growth. 
In terms of Beijing-Pyongyang economic relations, the economically deteriorating 
situation in North Korea continues to impose on Beijing a number of refugees in China’s 
Northeastern provinces--a region crowded by ethnic Koreans and their developed 
industries as well as bearing economic burdens. In the event of a worst case scenario, it 
might bring about a Second Korean War and it might become the largest obstacle to 
China’s national interests, or achievement of the four modernizations. That is why 
Beijing is very interested in stability on the peninsula. Apart from this issue, although the 
PRC has successfully achieved steady, rapid, and remarkable economic development 
since Deng’s reform and open door policies, it has some serious problems. Among them 
are an income chasm among the Chinese people and serious unemployment issues. If 
those problems deteriorate continuously, it might become a main reason for a second 
Tienanmen incident or cause political instability that could lead minority ethnic peoples 
to undertake secession movements. For instance, as Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji stated 
during his visit to the United States in 1999, China’s leaders are “concerned about 
economic insecurity” in terms of “the 100 million unemployed workers and the 18 
million unemployed urban workers.”215 
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On the other hand, “The increasing economic interdependence between China and 
the ROK is closely connected with China’s national security.”216 “Given that foreign 
direct investment (FDI) has been a key factor in China’s economic growth over the past 
decade, Korea has been a significant contributor to the Chinese economy” since the 
establishment of the Sino-South Korea normalization in 1992. In fact, “China is now the 
number one recipient of Korean investment, pushing the U.S. down to second place for 
the first time.”217 Moreover, “A large percent of Korean FDI has gone to China’s three 
northeastern provinces--Heilongjiang, Liaoning, and Jilin--a region with a high 
concentration of state-owned heavy industries, many of them on the verge of financial 
bankruptcy.”218 The primary reason that South Korea is enthusiastic about its FDI 
investments in those provinces is not only because of geographical proximity but also 
because of ethnic Koreans living in those three provinces.  
When the two Koreas are unified under the Seoul government, it could become “a 
middle power” in the region in terms of geopolitical importance and on an economic 
scale. As Ming Liu argued, a unified Korea “would hold a respectable and possibly 
commanding position as a middle power: South Korea is an OECD member, the 13th 
largest trading power, the 11th GDP ranking, and the 30th per capita income ranking in the 
world.” 219 In addition, a unified Korea would be an “economic power house” because it 
would have a population of 78.2 million and its total GNP could reach $990 billion in 
2010 and grow to $2 trillion by the year 2021.220 Under these circumstances, Korean 
unification “will provide great dividends to China with the removal of a source of tension 
and the opportunity for renewed commercial benefits.” In addition, “a unified diplomatic 
environment will free China from the difficulties of managing certain contingencies” 
from the divided two Koreas on the Korean peninsula. It is also expected that “the Tumen 
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River Development Project and Northeast Asian economic cooperation will be facilitated 
following Korean unification.”221  Moreover, the gradual and increasing development 
between the PRC and a unified Korea in light of their economic and social ties would 
contribute to enhancing China’s political stability in such economically important regions 
as China’s Northeastern provinces, which is an indispensable factor for its economic 
growth.   
 
C. GREAT POWERS DYNAMICS 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union that had threatened China from its north, 
the PRC has enjoyed a stable security environment for maintaining its rapid economic 
growth. Within such a favorable milieu to the PRC, however, “an expansion of U.S. 
dominance or a Japanese military resurgence in Northeast Asia…would be viewed as a 
main security threat by Beijing”222 because the “United States and Japan are the only two 
world-class players who could cause new security concerns for China in this region, by 
means of a dominant U.S. power pursuing ‘hegemonic’ policies there and an rearmed 
aggressive Japan.”223 For instance, it was reported at a major People’s Liberation’s Army 
(PLA) conference held in late 1993 to discuss primary security threats to Beijing that 
about 50 percent of the participants believed Japan would be “the primary threat in the 
next century”, and 40 percent of them regarded the United States as the second potential 
enemy, and the rest “believed it would be a resurgent Russia.”224  
In light of the perceived U.S. hegemony in this region, just as Beijing believes 
that the United States tries to intervene in its internal affairs such as human rights, 
Taiwan issues and the Tienanmen incident, so does Seoul in the same way. For example, 
anti-Americanism has risen in South Korea because of such sensitive issues as U.S. 
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pressure on the Korean economy since the late 1980s, the 1994 Agreed Framework 
negotiation process, U.S. hawkish dealing with the ROK during the financial crisis of 
1997-1998, the two Koreas’ summit in 2000, and the Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA) revision emanating from two middle school girls’ death by a U.S. armored tank 
in 2002, etc. “In the balance-of-power game aimed at the Japanese and the Americans, 
both Koreas are generally considered to be in the same camp as the Chinese.” Also, 
“Beijing believes that all three share victimization by America’s annoying ‘human rights’ 
policies in Asia; Washington’s notion of human rights, its advocates argue, is undesirable 
and offensive throughout the whole East Asian region.”225  
In terms of Japanese rearmament, a high security priority of Beijing is to prevent 
Japan from remilitarizing.226 Both the PRC and the ROK are worried that Japan “strives 
to expand the role of its Self-Defense Forces under the pretext not only of defending 
itself against such North Korean provocations as missile test-firing and infiltration of 
[North Korean] suspicious vessels, but also of helping the U.S. in its war against 
terrorism” 227 as well as the U.S.-led theater missile defense (TMD) program that aims 
mainly or explicitly at North Korea and probably--or implicitly--at China and Russia. For 
most Chinese and Korean people, the Japanese atrocities toward their parents or 
grandparents’ generations before and during the Pacific War cannot be forgettable and be 
forgiven in their minds. Today a strong anti-Japanese sentiment is still easily found in 
both China and Korea because of the distorted history books, comfort women scandal, 
Prime Ministers’ Yaskuni Shrine ceremony controversy, and territorial claim issues that 
have occurred periodically in Japan. Due to the Japanese claim to Tokdo island in the 
East Sea of Korea, the Japanese atrocities during the 36 year-long colonization period, 
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and Japan being a “quasi-nuclear power,” 228 “it’s not surprising that the Korean people 
perceive Japan as more threatening”229 than any other country.  
Against these backdrops, today, China’s South Korea policy is focused on the 
prevention of Seoul to “stand on the side of the United States or Japan” after Korean 
reunification.230 “China’s key national-security objective on the Korean peninsula is to 
have a friendly, stable Korea on its doorstep.”231 When Korean unification comes true, it 
is strongly expected that a unified Korea could “become the region’s most sought-after 
ally as the largest, richest, and most powerful nation without ‘historical baggage’ of 
territorial ambitions.” Thus, “China would no doubt be eager to ensure that a unified 
nation was at least not hostile to Chinese interests; Japan and the United States could not 
afford a Korea that was tied too closely to China.”232 Therefore, four major powers--the 
PRC, the United States, Russia and Japan--in the East Asian region “will have to re-
consider Korea’s propensity as a large power, its policy positions and subtle influence, 
and even try to woo Korean support on certain controversial issues.”233 More 
importantly, because the very reason for the U.S. troops’ presence in the peninsula--since 
the establishment of the Korean War armistice agreement and the U.S.-ROK alliance in 
1953--has been to defend South Korea’s sovereignty against an attack on South Korea by 
North Korea, a unified Korea might require a U.S. military withdrawal. After the U.S. 
withdrawal from a unified Korea (and if it happens, in Japan as well), it is possible that 
arm races among a unified Korea, China, Russia, and Japan would take place. When this 
scenario occurs, China and a unified Korea would tend to depend on each other, 
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regarding one another “as a counterweight to the increasing economic and military 
strength of Japan”234--when considering the two countries’ historical humiliations 
suffered at the hands of Japan especially since the Sino-Japanese War--and to the U.S 
military and economic hegemony in Northeast Asia.  
Finally, the Korean peninsula has been historically and geopolitically important to 
China’s national security. This is unlikely to change. “To reduce America’s influence 
and, if possible, to exclude Japan from playing a leading role there, China will pursue a 
more proactive Korea policy”235 in favor of Korean unification. 
 
D. TERRITORIAL AND ETHNIC KOREAN ISSUES 
The PRC shares an 800 mile long border with Korea--whether it is the DPRK or a 
unified Korea in the future. When the two Koreas are unified, a unified Korea may 
rekindle the territorial issues that had been resolved by Zhou En-lai and Kim Il Sung in 
the early 1960s. A unified Korea may request China to reconsider “historical precedents, 
including the Second Border Survey and Demarcation carried out jointly by the Qing and 
Chosun Dynasties in 1887 or the China-Korea Tumen Border Treaty signed between the 
Qing Dynasty and Japan in 1909 in order to press their claim for full sovereignty overt 
Tianchi (or Heaven Lake, Chonji in Korean).” More importantly, “Such territorial 
demands by a unified Korea may extend so far as to include the entire 42,700 square 
kilometer are of the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Region beyond the Yalu River, which 
is inhabited by over 0.85 million ethnic Koreans and 1.35 million of other 
nationalities.”236 Besides, among about two million ethnic Koreans in these provinces, 
“nearly half” live in the Yanbian Autonomous Region of Jinlin Province. “They have 
resisted cultural absorption by China and maintain a strong sense of Korean identity.” 
Above all, “The official language of government, education, and the media in Yanbian is 
Korean.”237 According to a recent study by the Hudson Institute, “The potential for the 
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‘re-Koreanization’ of Chinese citizens of Korean descent, who are rediscovering their 
Korean heritage, is a problem for China.”238 It is strongly expected that their desires with 
regard to ‘re-Koreanization’ would become more prevalent after Korean unification that 
could facilitate a variety of economic and cultural exchanges between unified Koreans 
and ethnic Koreans in China living adjacent to a border due to geographical proximity.  
In addition, there exists another likely territorial dispute over seabed petroleum 
deposits in the West Sea (called by the Koreans) or the Yellow Sea (named by the 
Chinese) after Korean unification. Beginning in the early 1970s, South Korea-led 
petroleum exploration in the West Sea brought about “jurisdictional conflicts with 
Beijing.” According to China’s argument, the disputes occurred because South Korea 
explored petroleum deposits in the sea area “without first reaching a boundary 
agreement” with China. However, this issue became suspended due to the gradual 
improvement of the PRC-South Korea relations since the 1980s.239 
If such territorial issues would emerge after Korean reunification, it is expected 
that the two countries would settle them bilaterally and peacefully through negotiating 
processes. For example, despite “Beijing’s willingness to use force in 1974 and 1988 to 
expel Vietnamese encamped on various islands [in the South China Sea], and the 
occupation of Mischief Reef near the Philippines in early 1995,” the PRC subsequently 
has pursued “a more conciliatory approach.”240 In fact,  
China’s consistent policy is to settle territorial disputes peacefully, through 
negotiation. China insists on its sovereignty over the Nansha Islands 
according to historical facts…but it also insists on solving its disputes with 
Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines peacefully.241 
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Therefore, although Korean unification may raise such problems as possible 
territorial disputes and ethnic Korean issues in northeastern China, Korean unification 
would put the relationship between China and a unified Korea into closer contacts. This 
could lead to interdependent cooperation in order to “deal with a number of bilateral 
issues (such as the Chinese-North Korean Border Treaty of 1962, common usage of the 
Yalu and Tumen Rivers, the status of ethnic Koreans in China, the protection of China’s 
vested economic interests in Northern Korea, the joint hydroelectric power plants, border 
trade, and repatriation of Korean refugees) in a conciliatory and constructive fashion.”242 
 
E. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
The bilateral relationship between China and South Korea has continued to 
improve and develop each other’s national interests in a constructive and productive way 
since their normalization in 1992. Over time, while the Chinese leadership generation 
during Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping’s era viewed North Korea as the most important 
ideological ally with blood ties, “the younger generation, many of whom were victimized 
in the Cultural Revolution, regard the personality cult around the Kims with a mixture of 
revulsion and derision.”243 In addition, although China had regarded North Korea as a 
strategic buffer state on the Korean peninsula, Beijing “would not be opposed to the 
unification of Korea if it occurs peacefully.”244 As Cheng Yujie, a Chinese scholar, 
stated, the Chinese “know that the two Koreas will have to be reunified sooner or 
later…The issue is not whether the two Koreas will reunify, but how and when.”245 From 
the past Cold War world to the present post-Cold War era “Beijing’s Korea policy has 
traveled the route from being a Pyongyang-only ‘one-Korea policy,’ to a de facto ‘two-
Koreas policy,’ and then to a Seoul-centered ‘one-and-a-half-Koreas policy.’”246 Beijing 
has adopted a new policy toward the two Koreas, in which the PRC is “identifying 
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common strategic concern and promoting economic engagement” with the DPRK247 and 
at the same time “seeking common ground while reserving differences” with the ROK.248 
Under these circumstances, “When Korean unification finally occurs, China 
surely would prefer that it occur gradually, without open conflict or a sudden exodus of 
refugees.”249 In addition, when considering the present substantial situations between 
North and South Korea--the huge economic disparity between the North and the South as 
well as the continuously spiraling down economic hardship in the North--Beijing 
acquiesces to the fact that it is much more possible to reach Korean unification under 
South Korea than under North Korea. “Although China prefers a status quo on the 
peninsula,” in other words, “Beijing knows that it has little choice but to accept a unified 
Korea under Seoul’s leadership. China, however, would not tolerate a unified Korea 
under America’s leadership.”250 
After Korean unification, a unified Korea with a population of more than 70 
million people sharing a border with China will attract Chinese in all fields, and vice 
versa, largely due to geographical proximity and cultural similarity. Each country will be 
a market for the other’s goods as well as a source of interdependence for advanced 
technologies and various investments, with others lack. As Chu Shulong, a research 
fellow of the Research Institute of Contemporary International Relations of China, 
argued,  
The Korean reunification does good to us [i.e., the Chinese] in all aspects. 
The peaceful reunification will promote the reunification of China. At the 
same time, the Korean unification will also be beneficial to our economic 
development, since both Koreas are now among our greatest economic 
cooperative partners. 
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Moreover, “China and Korea were not, are not, and will not become antagonistic nations. 
China has no reason to oppose to the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula.”251 
In addition, Chen Fengjun, Professor of the College of International Relations of Beijing 
University, asserted,  
China supports the reunification of Korea, which is more advantageous 
than disadvantageous to China. From the view of security, Korean 
reunification will not undermine the strategic interest of our country…The 
improvement of inter-Korean relations and Korea’s peaceful reunification 
in the future will undoubtedly improve our surrounding security 
circumstances.252 
In sum, Korean unification would enhance Chinese security by eliminating the 
possibility of a second Korean War on the Korean peninsula and by bringing about a 
gradual reduction of the U.S. military presence or ultimate withdrawal of the U.S. troops 
from a unified Korean peninsula. It might be able to reap economic benefits for China’s 
northeastern region through cooperation with a unified Korea in light of geographic 
proximity while eliminating the economic burden resulting from North Korea. It would 
make relations between China and a unified Korea much closer based on cooperation for 
each other’s national interests--especially in the fields of economics and security. It could 
make China and a unified Korea regard each other as a hedge state in the case of a 
possible Japanese rearmament or remilitarization based on its economic and military 
strength when the U.S. troops might withdraw from Korea and Japan. Therefore, the 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. THE ROLE OF CHINA IN KOREAN UNIFICATION 
Historically, the Korean peninsula has played a geographically and strategically 
important role in East Asia, as a gateway between the Eurasian Continent and the Pacific 
Ocean, in which powerful countries such as China, the United States, the Soviet Union 
and Japan had--and have even today--struggled to attain influential power over the 
peninsula. Due to such a geo-strategically important position of the Korean peninsula in 
the region, on the one hand, Korea--like ‘shrimp between whales’--had suffered from the 
competition over the peninsula among the great powers as well as Chinese dynasties. 
This was well proven through the three wars that occurred on the Korean peninsula: the 
Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895, the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905, and the Korean 
War in 1950-1953 between the two Koreas but also including the superpowers--China, 
the United States and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Korea had considerably 
benefited from China in terms of Chinese developed political, economic, and cultural 
systems. 
The relations between China and Korea have lasted more than two thousand 
years. Although their first relationship was initiated from China’s four commanderies 
over the Korean peninsula, a sort of colony, the Korean people had autonomous rights to 
some large extent during that period and were also able to have contact with Chinese 
developed civilization. Additionally, even though almost all the dynasties of Korea 
established tributary relations with those of China, they could import an advanced 
civilization from China and then develop their own creative culture while keeping their 
peace with China through such a tributary system.  
The Korean people have experienced both faces toward China throughout Korea 
history. They know well the fact that Korea was able to achieve the first unification by 
Silla in the seventh century and to repel the Japanese invasions of Korea in the sixteenth 
century with China’s help. In addition, they appreciate the fact that China harbored and 
helped the Korean provisional government during the period of the Japanese colonization 
of Korea during the first half of the twentieth century and therefore the Korean 
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independence fighters were able to achieve their independence at last in 1945. On the 
other hand, South Koreans also acknowledge well the fact that Korea was not only 
threatened by China’s clandestine conspiracy to hold sway over the whole Korean 
peninsula right after the first unification by Silla but also suffered from such non-Chinese 
dynasties as the Khitan and Jurchen dynasties and the Mongol empire during a large part 
of Koryo, and the Manchu Ching dynasty’s intervention during the second half of the Yi 
dynasty. More importantly, it is the PRC’s intervention into the Korean War that South 
Koreans regard as a major reason that Korea has maintained its separated status as the 
two Koreas since 1953. 
In the Cold War era, the PRC was one of the ROK’s primary enemy states in 
tandem with the Soviet Union on the side of the DPRK in the Korean War in light of 
ideology. However, it has become one of the most important partnership countries of 
South Korea in terms of security and economy on the Korean peninsula in the post-Cold 
War world, especially since 1992 when Beijing and Seoul signed the full diplomatic 
relations between the PRC and the ROK. In the post-Cold War era, maintaining security 
and stability on the Korean peninsula (until Korean unification will be achieved through a 
peaceful process between North and South Korea) became a crucially important driving 
force not only for the national interests of both the PRC and the ROK, but also for 
regional peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia as well as on the peninsula.  
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Under these circumstances, the ROK’s amicable relations with the PRC, the 
DPRK and the United States must be extremely important factors for the security and 
prosperity of Northeast Asia as well as the Korean peninsula. Particularly among them, 
the PRC-ROK relationship has rapidly grown and constructively developed as a much 
more important factor for Korean reconciliation and reunification when considering the 
fact that the PRC is the only power having good relations with the ROK and the DPRK in 
the post-Cold War world. For instance, due to the PRC’s help the two Koreas 
simultaneously entered into the United Nations in 1991, the United States and the DPRK 
signed the Agreed Framework in 1994 to solve the nuclear crisis of 1993-1994 caused by 
North Korea, and the ROK President Kim Dae Jung and the DPRK Leader Kim Jung Il 
could sit around the table to take the first step toward Korean reconciliation and 
unification at two Koreas’ summit talk in Pyongyang in June 2000. In addition, it is 
because of the PRC’s advice or counsel that Kim Jong Il considers Chinese style reform 
policy in order to overcome economic difficulties and sustain his regime--as could be 
perceived during his several visits to China’s developed areas in 2000-2001. In addition, 
unlike Beijing’s past behavior toward affairs related to Pyongyang, the PRC’s changing 
attitude toward the current nuclear crisis posed by North Korea implies that China would 
play a more critical role in inter-Korean reconciliation and unification processes as well 
as North Korea’s reforms.253  
As Beijing has shown in these processes, it is expected that the PRC will enhance 
its efforts to devote itself to helping the two Koreas achieve inter-Korean reconciliation 
and reunification in favor of maximizing China’s national interests because Beijing’s 
leadership fully understands that lingering instability--and a ensuing second Korean War 
--on the Korean peninsula would have a hugely negative impact on China’s national 
interests. In particular, this would damage its continuous economic growth that is China’s 
key national interest and is most crucial to the future of both the CCP and the PRC. To 
this end, therefore, it is expected that the PRC’s role in Korean unification will be as 
follows: as a guarantor at the Four Power Talks to replace the 1953 armistice treaty with 
a permanent peace treaty conducive to reunification; as a main intermediary among the 
two Koreas and the United States to reduce tensions and facilitate reconciliation on the 
Korean peninsula; and as a main counselor to help North Korea follow China’s reform 
policy to decrease the economic disparity between the North and the South and increase 
inter-Korean cooperation. 
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First, the PRC is anticipated to play a role as a guarantor at the Four Power Talks 
to replace the 1953 armistice treaty with a permanent peace treaty conducive to 
reunification. The U.S. forces stationed in South Korea for about a half-century would 
become the largest obstacle for a reconciliation and reunification process on the Korean 
peninsula. From Pyongyang’s point of view, the U.S. troops operating within the ROK-
US Combined Forces Command (CFC) and with the U.S. commander enjoying 
operational control in time of war on the peninsula would continue to lead “North Korea 
to regard the United States as its main enemy, necessitating a bilateral peace agreement 
with the Untied States in order to bring the war to an end.” Coupled with the U.S. forces, 
in addition, the Military Armistice Commission and the U.N. Command’s “continuance 
would be incompatible with a peace agreement and with the normalization of relations” 
between the United States and North Korea.254 In fact, because North Korea has spent 
“approximately 20-25 percent of North Korea’s feeble gross domestic product” to 
maintain its more than one million conventional forces, “any policy leaving them intact 
will preclude hope for gradual economic reform in the North.”255 In this context, as 
Edward A. Olsen suggested, “though the United States is averse to appeasement of North 
Korea, there are logical reasons to use incremental U.S. forces cuts in Korea as 
bargaining chips in the inter-Korean peace process.” He also argued “It is entirely logical 
to trade off U.S. force cuts in South Korea for verifiable North Korean conventional-
force demobilization and elimination of all its weapons of mass destruction.”256 Under 
the circumstances, to make such a reconciliation and unification process operate 
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smoothly and effectively, it is so important for the PRC to guarantee as a member country 
of the Four Power Talks a formal and permanent peace treaty--or a non-aggression 
agreement at North Korea’s request--between Pyongyang and Washington that may help 
North Korea give up its current nuclear brinkmanship. This also would relieve it from its 
psychological burden imposed by the U.S. military threat as well as its economic burdens 
based on excessive defense expenditures, which would be conducive to induce North 
Korea to shift from its bellicose policy to a pragmatic one focusing on reforms while 
achieving the purpose of keeping North Korea from developing a serious nuclear 
program and maintaining weapons of mass destruction. 
Second, the PRC is estimated to play a role as a main intermediary among North 
and South Korea and the United States to reduce tensions and facilitate reconciliation on 
the Korean peninsula. The North Korean regime “wants to solve its [severe] economic 
difficulties through interchanges with the international community,”257 especially with 
the United States especially after it suffered from famine as a result of the floods during 
the mid-1990s. In terms of its relations with Washington, Pyongyang has tightly held its 
positions “on ending the abnormal hostile and belligerent DPRK-US relations and 
seeking normalization of bilateral relations.”258 However, “the Bush Administration is 
psychologically and diplomatically inclined to neglect and negate the principle of 
dialogue and talks” while, unlike other big powers, not backing South Korea’s 
engagement policy toward North Korea.259 With regard to this issue “Beijing has 
expressed disappointment and unhappiness over the U.S. and Japanese decisions not to 
establish full diplomatic relations with Pyongyang--long after Moscow and Beijing 
recognized Seoul.”260 Under these conditions, as the PRC played an intermediary role in 
accomplishing the South-North Basic Agreement in 1991, the Nuclear Agreed 
Framework (under which there obviously exists the item regarding U.S.-North Korean 
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normalization) between Washington and Pyongyang in 1994, and the two Koreas’ 
summit talks in Pyongyang in 2000, it is the PRC that must be able to play a key role as 
an intermediate actor among the two Koreas and the United States in the process of U.S.-
North Korean normalization. If normalization between the United States and the North is 
established, there will be no reason for Pyongyang to persist in its nuclear program and 
consequently for the United States to develop the Theater Missile Defense system with 
Japan and Taiwan that South Korea refused, which aims at the DPRK as well as the PRC. 
More importantly, full diplomatic relations between Washington and Pyongyang could 
facilitate North Korea’s access to the trade, investment, and technology of the United 
States and its allies. Such a repercussion would be beneficial to the PRC’s national 
interests as well. Therefore, in addition to seeking a formal and permanent peace treaty 
between Washington and Pyongyang, the PRC is expected to actively play a role as a 
main intermediary among the two Koreas and the United States to persuade Washington 
to “begin to practically discharge the duty of obtaining normalization of political and 
economic relations with the DPRK” in order to make North Korea “to a large extent 
amend its [bellicose] behavior.”261 
Third, the PRC is also expected to play a role as a main counselor to help North 
Korea follow China’s reform policy to decrease the economic disparity between the 
North and the South and increase inter-Korean cooperation. “Encouraged by the success 
of their own pragmatic economic reforms,” as early as around 1983, the PRC has 
“prodded Pyongyang to consider similar reforms.”262 However, the Tienanmen incident 
in 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 that made the North Korean regime 
associate the main causes of these events with Beijing and Moscow’s reform and opening 
up policies gave the North’s leaders a negative impression of reforms involved with the 
West, particularly the United States. Pyongyang’s leaders, in fact, are very concerned 
about a possible demise of their regime as a result of reform and opening up policies. 
However, the PRC’s success at economic reforms could convince the North Korean 
regime of “the possibility of introducing reforms into centrally planned economies while 
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maintaining regime stability for extended periods.”263 Especially, when considering that 
“Goldman Sachs estimates the cost of economic reconstruction of North Korea and 
overall Korean unification will be $1 trillion,”264 it is a prerequisite for unification to 
streamline the worst economic structures of the North and reduce the current economic 
disparity between the two Koreas through North Korea’s reforms. During Kim Jong Il’s 
recent visits to China--in May 2000 and especially to GM and NEC factories in Shanghai 
in January 2001--he said, “the reform and opening up policy adopted by the CPC is 
correct.” It implied that he “would follow the example of China to push forward the 
DPRK’s reform and opening up.”265 North Korea tried to initiate these economic reforms 
in July 2002, but it “revealed a lack of the technical knowledge of past experience in 
other countries with similar problems necessary to make the reforms effective.”266 “It is 
here, in the field of economic cooperation and encouraging North Korea to embark on a 
Chinese path of economic reform, Beijing feels it has an enormous role to play.”267 
However, although Kim Jong Il “has a favorable thinking to carry out reform…it won’t 
be easy for the military apparatus and high officials of North Korea to actively implement 
dear leader’s instruction.” Moreover, “their policy-orientation still remains in preparation 
for military confrontation rather than the external economic cooperation and opening 
policy.”268 Under the circumstance, the PRC’s role as a main counselor for the military 
apparatus and high officials in the DPRK with regard to Pyongyang’s reforms is needed 
to persuade them to forgo such a bellicose policy in their mind. If the North actively 
cooperates with the South and the West under the PRC’s counsel regarding reforms in the 
North, “the costs and burden emanating from the assumed unification would not go 
astronomical…and it would look more inviting for North Korean people to accept 
peaceful unification with Seoul.”269 In addition, “the economic cooperation will be 
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regarded by DPRK as less sensitive and risky but more beneficial than any other kind of 
cooperation, which certainly will facilitate mitigating the lingering mistrust between two 
Koreas, creating great possibility for other high-politics cooperation and integration in the 
future.”270 Incremental social, cultural, and economic exchanges between the South and 
the North--with the PRC’s successful experiences of opening up and reform policies as a 
role model--through the tourism business using both roads and railway, the mutual 
correspondence and the reunions among more than ten million separated families, and 
construction of infrastructure and industries in the North, help the two Koreas reduce the 
disparity and eliminate the heterogeneity created by severance of about a half century. 
Eventually this will enhance confidence building which must be conducive to the first 
step toward the inter-Korean reconciliation and reunification process. More importantly, 
“Beijing’s ultimate goal with regard to North Korea is de-escalation and reform; China 
strives to prevent the sudden collapse of Kim Jong Il’s regime, steer the North toward 
reform, and work for the peaceful reunification of the peninsula on the South’s terms, 
which might ultimately result in the withdrawal of US troops from Korea.”271 Therefore, 
the PRC is also expected to actively play a key role as a main counselor to help North 
Korea follow China’s reform policy 
In the context of these circumstances, finally, the relations between the PRC and 
the ROK must make every endeavor, in constructive ways, to make the DPRK open itself 
to the world as well as to change its bellicose policy into a pragmatic one in order to gain 
a firm groundwork for peaceful Korean unification. For the purposes of a permanent 
peace treaty and normalization between the United States and the DPRK, in addition, the 
PRC and the ROK must do their best to play a crucial role in shifting the United States’ 
hard-line policy toward North Korea into an engagement one in accord with that of the 
South Korean government as did President Clinton in his late presidency--needless to say 
fostering favorable international conditions--for North Korea’s systemic change. 
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B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
“A sudden and unexpected unification” through an abrupt demise of the North 
Korean regime “may precipitate tragic chaos” to the PRC as well as the two Koreas. 
Thus, “only a peaceful and gradual unification should be acceptable.”272 To achieve such 
a reunification process, the two Koreas must establish and maintain amicable relations 
with neighboring powers that have had a huge impact on the Korean peninsula’s past and 
present fate—for they will exert considerable influence on its future fate. “Although the 
Korean peninsula is a place where the interest of the four great powers converge[s], the 
US and China will be the key players in any Korean unification process, in addition to the 
two Koreas themselves.”273 This is reinforced by considering the unavoidable fact that 
the United States has a half century-long alliance treaty with the ROK and the PRC is the 
only state having good relations with the two Koreas.  
In this context, to bring about peace and the ultimate goal of the two Koreas, 
peaceful reunification, on the peninsula, first of all both North Korea and the United 
States should strive to improve their relations through giving up the North’s nuclear 
program and achieve normalization between Washington and Pyongyang in order to 
reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula. At the same time, North Korea “has to pursue a 
reform process analogous to the Chinese experience in order to achieve convergence with 
the South.”274  
For these purposes, I would like to offer policy recommendations for those who 
work for the ROK government, especially the Ministry of Unification of the ROK, in 
order to help them create a policy toward the PRC in favor of a South Korean-led, 
reasonable and peaceful unification on the Korean peninsula. 
First, the ROK government should strive to reenergize the Four-Power Peace 
Talks. The Four-Power Talks initiated by the U.S. and ROK governments in 1996, which 
aim to achieve a formal and permanent peace treaty on the Korean peninsula are 
indispensable for the Korean peace process. However, the Four-Power Peace Talks have 
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been deadlocked since August 1999, when North Korea refused to attend the talks. The 
ROK government should strive to induce North Korea to participate in the talks while 
reminding the North that the Four-Power Peace Talks “could be the best deal for North 
Korea, because (1) cross-recognition by the four major powers may be achieved through 
the four-party talks, (2) North Korea’s survival may be guaranteed by the international 
community, (3) South Korea’s positive economic assistance to the North could be 
promised, and (4) inter-Korean arms control agreement would further reduce the burden 
of North Korea’s defense expenditure.”275 At the same time, the ROK government also 
has to try to make both the PRC and the United States actively and constructively take 
part in the talks to bring about peace agreements between South and North Korea, North 
Korea and the United States, the United States and the PRC, and the PRC and South 
Korea in order to “legally end the Korean War” and make an amicable environment for 
the inter-Korean reconciliation and reunification process.276 
Second, maintaining firm alliance relations with the United States, the ROK 
government must strive to persuade the U.S. administration to pursue an engagement 
policy toward the DPRK as did President Clinton. Above all, the ROK government 
should make every effort to induce the U.S. government to establish normalized relations 
with the DPRK regime. Because “refusal of the recognition of the North or containing the 
North makes no help to resolve the problems and peace establishment in the Korean 
Peninsula”277 and “allowing North Korea to undertake the production of fissile material 
and nuclear bombs would be a major setback for American security, for regional security, 
and for international security,”278 the U.S.-DPRK normalization process that would bring 
about a formal and permanent peace treaty between them is “a necessary step to ease 
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tension and to move to a real peace process in the Korean Peninsula.”279 North Korean 
leaders “still hold the military capability [that] is their last ace for bargaining, for dignity 
and for sovereignty.” “Only when they thought the U.S. takes a real benign policy 
towards them both in security and in its external relations can they consider negotiating 
with the U.S. on a peace treaty, involving conventional weapons as well as the destiny of 
American forces in the peninsula.”280 Therefore, to reduce North Korea’s military 
capability including its nuclear program, over one million conventional forces, and 
WMD, which the North’s leaders have regarded as legitimized by their dignity as well as 
their sovereignty, there is a good reason for the ROK government to induce the U.S. 
government to positively reconsider normalization with the DPRK, which the Pyongyang 
regime has requested from the U.S. government and persistently sought in order to assure 
its regime survival. At the same time, the ROK government also must try to alleviate 
anti-Americanism that has expanded in South Korea. As a result of a series of events 
mentioned in Chapter IV (see pp. 50-53), “the South Korean people are taking a more 
critical view on American policy towards North Korea.” The phenomenon “demonstrates 
that the growing sentiment of one Korea nation outruns [the] importance of [the] 
American-South Korean alliance in a sense.”281 However, “Seoul has to maintain a 
friendly and mutually beneficial relationship with the U.S., not only for economic 
interests but also to serve strategic and reunification goals”282 because “U.S. support for 
reunification, as well as for post-reunification reconstruction, will be indispensable.”283 
“For Korea, the ties with the United States bind it politically and strategically to the 
network of developed economies that includes Japan, North America, and Europe. This 
arrangement, in return, makes possible profitable economic intercourse by keeping the 
peace and maintaining international institutions that foster economic growth.”284 
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Third, maintaining good relations with Beijing, the South Korean government 
should make every effort to persuade the PRC to “abandon its traditional passive posture 
in favor of a more active diplomatic role” and to induce it to “be more direct in warning 
North Korea that its [bellicose] actions threaten fundamental Chinese security [and 
economic] interests.” Since the Beijing-Seoul normalization in 1992, the PRC and the 
ROK have “consult[ed] with and support[ed] each other about strategy toward the DPRK. 
Both governments favor engagement with the North, a reformist North Korea, and 
eventual peaceful unification.”285 Moreover, “Less known to most Americans, in recent 
years China has become South Korea’s primary economic partner and frequent 
diplomatic asset regarding the inter-Korean relationship.”286 Although the PRC played a 
key role in making the two Koreas simultaneously enter the United Nations in 1991, 
resolving the nuclear crisis in 1994, and achieving the two Koreas’ summit in 2000, 
however, Beijing has shown somewhat passive attitudes in dealing with North Korean 
affairs in the international community. Such cautious Chinese attitudes toward North 
Korean issues would not help to sustain its security and economic interests and also could 
have a negative impact on enhancing amicable relations with the United States and South 
Korea. If North Korea attains a lot of nuclear weapons--as a result of Beijing’s passive 
attitudes toward North Korean issues--and uses them as a method to keep its regime from 
collapsing, it would heavily harm the national interests of both the PRC and the ROK. To 
prevent such a worst case from coming true, the ROK government should urge the PRC 
to take a much more positive and active role in dealing with North Korean issues. 
“Threatening to cut off…[Beijing’s oil and food] aid” to the North for the purpose of 
inducing North Korea to give up its nuclear program, inviting North Korea to begin 
reforms and opening up policies, and forcing North Korea to attend a negotiating table 
with the United States “would be risky, but might be the only way to head off even worse 
consequences” when considering China’s status as a primary donor of oil and food for the 
North.287 At the same time, as part of persuading the United States to utilize an 
                                                 
285 David Shambaugh. “China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term.” The 
Washington Quarterly. Spring 2003, p. 49.  
286 Edward. A. Olsen. “China: The Great Korean Hope?” The Monterey Herald. January 12, 2003. p. 
F3. 
98 
287 Phillip C Saunders and Jing-dong Yuan. “Korea Crisis and Test Chinese Diplomacy.” Asia Times. 
January 8, 2003 accessed in [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/EA08Dg03.html]. 
engagement policy toward the DPRK, the ROK government should urge the PRC to 
induce the U.S. administration to normalize its relations with the North Korean regime 
and to sign a formal and permanent peace treaty with it in order to reduce tensions and to 
increase stability and prosperity in the Northeast Asian region as well as on the Korean 
peninsula. 
Most importantly, the ROK government should never forget the importance of 
both the PRC and the United States in the inter-Korean reconciliation and reunification 
process. In other words, the South Korean government “must avoid making premature 
choices…That is, Seoul must maximize what it has, the security alliance with the U.S. 
and economic bilateralism with China, while minimizing any commitments on issues 
beyond its control.”288 In addition, the ROK government should not overlook the 
important point that the prospect of the future relationship between China and Korea, “to 
a great extent, would be decided by the political development within the peninsula and 
the relations among China, the United States, Japan and Russia, especially the bilateral 
relationship between China and the U.S.”289 The reason is because “continued 
confrontation between the U.S. and China will improve neither regional security nor the 
prospects for peaceful Korean unification,”290 the ROK government should make every 
effort to help the PRC and the United States develop and maintain Beijing-Washington 
good relations that would be conducive to the Korean reunification process. 
Finally, if the two Koreas achieve a peaceful reunification with both the PRC and 
the United States’ aid under favorable circumstances suggested above, a unified Korea 
should strive to maintain good relations with the two countries. Any remaining U.S. 
troops presence on a unified Korean peninsula, above all, might become the hottest issue 
to the PRC. From the PRC’s point of view, the U.S. forces stationed in a unified Korea 
would be regarded as an anti-Chinese foothold as well as a primary impetus for 
instigating China to build a much stronger PLA that would necessitate increasing its 
defense expenditure. With regard to this important issue, a unified Korea and the United 
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States government have to bear in mind that they should try to give the PRC acceptable 
reasons for a U.S. troop presence on the Korean peninsula after unification, which would 
foster better relations between a unified Korea, China, Russia and Japan, restrain a severe 
arms race among them, and thus provide economic benefits to all of them. Another 
important issue regarding a unified Korea’s relations with the PRC and the United States 
after Korean reunification would be both the PRC and the United States’ postures toward 
a unified Korea. In other words, Beijing and Washington should not regard their relations 
with a unified Korea as a client state like Chinese dynasties did toward Korean dynasties 
with a tributary system and the U.S. government did toward the ROK government during 
the past several decades. Such negative postures toward a unified Korea would make a 
unified Korea lean toward other powers such as Russia and even Japan despite 
historically antagonistic relations as a hedge power against the PRC and the United 
States. The PRC and the United States should bear in mind that they should try to 
develop and enhance their relations with a unified Korea based on the concept of a real 
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